Welch v. Mr. Christmas Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 143 (1982)
A defendant’s immunity from a claim for invasion of privacy is limited to the scope of the consent provided, and any use exceeding that consent constitutes a violation of New York Civil Rights Law § 51.
Summary
Welch sued Mr. Christmas Inc. for violating his right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law § 51 by using his photographs beyond the scope of his consent. Welch had placed a limitation on the consent form after the photographs were taken. The court held that because the statute requires written consent, Welch had the right to limit his consent in any way he chose, even after the photos were taken, and any use beyond that limited consent constituted a violation. The court reinstated Welch’s claims, emphasizing that the consent defined the boundaries of permissible use.
Facts
Welch’s photographs were taken by Mr. Christmas Inc. Subsequently, Welch signed a consent form but added a limitation regarding the use of the photographs. Mr. Christmas Inc. used the photographs in a manner that exceeded the limitations Welch placed on the consent form.
Procedural History
The lower court dismissed Welch’s first, third, and fourth causes of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the dismissal of the first, third, and fourth causes of action, reinstating those claims.
Issue(s)
Whether a limitation placed on a consent form after photographs are taken, but before the use of those photographs, is effective to limit the scope of consent under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.
Holding
Yes, because Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires written consent, and absent estoppel, the timing of the consent does not limit the plaintiff’s right to define the scope of that consent.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the defendant’s immunity from a privacy claim is “no broader than the consent executed to him.” The court emphasized the plaintiff’s statutory right to limit his consent in any way he deemed proper. The court stated, “Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires ‘the written consent’ of such person and, absent facts, not here pleaded, upon which an estoppel could be grounded, the fact that the consent was signed after, rather than before, the photographic session, imposed no limitation upon the absolute right granted plaintiff by the statute to limit his consent in any way he deemed proper or desirable.” Any use of the photographs beyond the granted consent gives rise to a cause of action under Section 51, and the plaintiff is not limited to a contract action. The court relied on its prior holding in Shields v. Gross, emphasizing that consent defines the boundaries of permissible use.