People v. Mahoney, 58 N.Y.2d 475 (1983): Admissibility of Evidence Seized Before Physical Possession of Search Warrant

People v. Mahoney, 58 N.Y.2d 475 (1983)

A search conducted pursuant to a validly issued search warrant is not rendered unconstitutional merely because the executing officers did not have the warrant in their physical possession at the time of entry, provided they knew it had been issued.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police officers could enter a suspect’s home before a search warrant’s physical arrival, given their knowledge of its issuance. Police obtained a “no-knock” warrant to search Mahoney’s residence based on informant information. Surveillance indicated restless behavior by the occupants. Officers entered before the warrant’s arrival, detained the occupants, and then conducted the search once the warrant arrived. Mahoney argued the entry was illegal, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that physical possession of the warrant at the time of entry was not required because the warrant had been issued. The key factor was that a neutral magistrate had already determined probable cause existed.

Facts

Detective Milham arranged to buy cocaine from David Longe. Longe and his girlfriend, Mary Lou Rorick, went to Peter Mahoney’s house, where Longe asked Rorick to deliver the cocaine to the Holiday Inn. After Rorick and defendant’s girlfriend were arrested after selling cocaine to Detective Milham, Rorick told the police that Longe could be located at Mahoney’s residence with a half-pound of cocaine and 40 pounds of marijuana. Police officers were dispatched to surveil Mahoney’s residence. Officers observed Longe and Mahoney pacing and looking out the window. Detective Milham obtained a “no-knock” search warrant for Mahoney’s residence. The surveillance team was informed the warrant had been signed. Before Detective Milham arrived with the warrant, officers broke down the door and entered the residence. Mahoney and Longe were taken into custody. Detective Milham arrived five minutes later with the warrant, and a search was conducted, revealing cocaine and marijuana. Mahoney waived his Miranda rights and admitted to letting Longe use his house to store drugs in exchange for marijuana and cocaine.

Procedural History

An Albany County Grand Jury indicted Mahoney for criminal possession of a controlled substance and marijuana. The trial court denied Mahoney’s motion to suppress the physical evidence and his incriminating statement. Mahoney pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and was sentenced to six years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Mahoney’s motion to suppress. Leave to appeal was granted by a Justice of the Appellate Division.

Issue(s)

Whether the entry by police into a residence pursuant to a validly executed but undelivered search warrant is illegal, violating the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Holding

No, because once a warrant had been issued by a neutral magistrate, physical possession of the warrant at the time of entry was not required under the facts of this case.

Court’s Reasoning

The court distinguished this case from Payton v. New York, which prohibited warrantless home entries absent exigent circumstances, because in this case, the police obtained a warrant before entering Mahoney’s residence. The court emphasized that the “evil Payton sought to prevent was the warrantless entry inside a home to search for weapons or contraband.” The court highlighted that Detective Milham sought a warrant after receiving firsthand information about the drugs. The police waited until being informed that a warrant had been issued before entering the premises. The purpose of the warrant procedure, which is to place a neutral magistrate between the police and the citizen, was fully complied with. CPL 690.50(1), requiring officers to show the warrant upon request, was deemed inapplicable because the warrant was executed pursuant to CPL 690.50(2), which allowed a no-knock entry. The court stated, “The fact that the officers entered defendant’s house without actual possession of the search warrant, which they knew had been issued, in no way interfered with defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. The entry and search in this case was authorized by a magistrate prior to the entry and search occurring. Our Federal and State Constitutions require nothing more.”