Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500 (1983)
In negligence cases, recovery for emotional distress is limited to situations where the emotional injury is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach of duty owed to the plaintiff.
Summary
A dentist sued a medical supply company for negligence after they incorrectly labeled an anesthetic machine, leading him to administer nitrous oxide instead of oxygen to a patient, causing her death. The dentist claimed this incident caused him emotional distress, forcing him to withdraw from his practice. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the dentist could recover pecuniary losses, he could not recover for emotional injuries. The court reasoned that emotional distress was a consequential, not direct, result of the defendant’s negligence, and allowing such recovery would create an unworkable expansion of liability.
Facts
The plaintiff, a dentist, purchased an anesthetic machine from the defendants. The defendants overhauled the machine, but negligently reversed the color-coded decals for oxygen and nitrous oxide. The defendants also failed to install, or inform the plaintiff that they could install, connectors of different sizes for the oxygen and nitrous oxide, which would have prevented improper connection of the machine. Consequently, when the dentist attempted to administer oxygen to a patient after extracting teeth, he inadvertently administered nitrous oxide, resulting in the patient’s death. A wrongful death action was filed against the dentist, and he was subject to a criminal investigation. As a result, the dentist suffered mental ill health, damage to his reputation, and was forced to withdraw from his practice.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court held that the dentist was entitled to recover for both emotional harm and pecuniary loss. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint and holding that no cause of action was stated when emotional harm results indirectly through the reaction of the plaintiff to injury negligently caused to another. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the claim for pecuniary losses but denying recovery for emotional injuries.
Issue(s)
Whether a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress when that distress results from the plaintiff’s reaction to the injury negligently caused to a third party, where the plaintiff was the instrument of that injury due to the defendant’s negligence.
Holding
No, because recovery for emotional injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach of duty.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reviewed prior cases involving recovery for emotional harm, categorizing them into three groups: (1) cases where breach of a duty directly results in emotional harm, (2) cases like Tobin v. Grossman where a bystander seeks recovery for emotional distress caused by injury to another, and (3) cases where violation of a duty results in physical injury to a third person and financial or emotional harm to the plaintiff. The court stated, “[T]here is no duty to protect from emotional injury a bystander to whom there is otherwise owed no duty, and, even as to a participant to whom a duty is owed, such injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach.” The court found that the dentist’s emotional distress was a consequential result of the defendant’s negligence, similar to the parents’ distress in Howard v. Lecher. Allowing recovery here would create an unmanageable expansion of liability. The court emphasized that the distinction between direct and consequential injuries, while potentially fine, is necessary to create a “rational practical boundary for liability.” Quoting Tobin v Grossman, the court reasoned that drawing any line necessarily differentiates between close cases, and permitting recovery for emotional injury in this case, while denying it to the patient’s family, would be anomalous. The court also noted the speculativeness of damages. The dissent argued the dentist was the instrument of the patient’s death because of the defendant’s negligence, making the injury direct, but the majority rejected this argument.