People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981)
A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity without violating double jeopardy protections when a juror’s conduct indicates an inability to fairly and impartially deliberate.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that declaring a mistrial in Tinsley’s first trial due to a juror’s misconduct did not violate double jeopardy principles. After jury deliberations began, a juror disappeared overnight and expressed doubts about his ability to be fair. The trial court, after interviewing the juror and consulting with counsel, declared a mistrial. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court acted within its discretion, as there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. The court also rejected Tinsley’s claims regarding pretrial identification and jury instructions.
Facts
During Tinsley’s first trial, after the jury was charged and sequestered, a juror disappeared overnight and returned the following morning. The juror stated that the deliberations had caused him distress and he doubted the jury’s ability to resolve the issues fairly without legal expertise. He expressed that he could not be fair to the defendant.
Procedural History
The trial court, after interviewing the juror and discussing potential remedies with counsel (who declined to move for a mistrial), declared a mistrial. Tinsley was retried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tinsley appealed, arguing that the mistrial declaration violated double jeopardy principles and that there were errors in the pretrial identification procedure and jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and judgment.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial sua sponte, thus unconstitutionally exposing the defendant to double jeopardy?
2. Whether the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, tainting the in-court identification?
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the presumption of correctness of the date on a check?
Holding
1. No, because the trial court was warranted in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity given the juror’s misconduct and expressed inability to be fair.
2. No, because the suppression court made dual findings that the pre-trial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and that there was an independent source for the in-court identification.
3. No, because in the prosecution of a crime of violence the trial court was within its discretion to reject a jury instruction regarding the presumption of correctness applicable to commercial paper.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the “unusual circumstances” presented by the juror’s behavior and statements. The court cited People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1, 9, emphasizing the principle of manifest necessity as the standard for justifying a mistrial without violating double jeopardy. The court found the juror’s overnight absence and subsequent admission of bias created a situation where a fair trial was impossible. The failure of the trial court to consult further with counsel prior to the declaration of mistrial did not vitiate the propriety of such declaration; the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no acceptable alternative to a mistrial. The court deferred to the suppression court’s findings regarding the pretrial identification procedure, noting evidence supported those findings, referencing People v. Dickerson, 50 NY2d 937. Regarding the jury instruction on the check’s date, the court found no error, implicitly stating that rules applicable to commercial paper generally do not apply in a case involving violent crime, especially where the factual issue involves violence not commercial transactions.