61 N.Y.2d 690 (1984)
When a parolee is incarcerated in another state, the burden rests on New York parole authorities to demonstrate that they were unable to conduct timely parole revocation hearings because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, regardless of whether the Interstate Compact for parole supervision was formally invoked.
Summary
Wilson, a New York parolee, was incarcerated in Connecticut for a robbery conviction. New York issued a parole violation warrant but delayed the revocation hearing until after Wilson completed his Connecticut sentence. Wilson argued he was denied a timely hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the parole authorities had the burden to prove Wilson was not under their practical control, irrespective of formal Interstate Compact supervision. The case was remitted to determine if Wilson was subject to New York’s control while in Connecticut custody.
Facts
In 1976, Wilson was sentenced in New York for criminal sale of a controlled substance and paroled in 1977.
In 1979, he was arrested and convicted of robbery in Connecticut, receiving a prison sentence.
New York issued a parole violation warrant in July 1979 and sent it to Connecticut authorities.
The New York parole board declared Wilson delinquent in October 1979, requesting his return upon release from Connecticut custody.
No parole revocation hearings were held until after Wilson’s Connecticut parole in March 1982.
Procedural History
Wilson commenced an Article 78 proceeding in September 1981, arguing denial of a timely parole revocation hearing.
Special Term dismissed the petition, finding Wilson not subject to New York parole authorities’ control because Connecticut had not accepted him for parole supervision under the Interstate Compact.
The Appellate Division affirmed, distinguishing People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, 52 N.Y.2d 9 (1980).
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether New York parole authorities have a duty to provide a timely parole revocation hearing to a parolee incarcerated in another state, even if that state has not formally accepted supervision of the parolee under the Interstate Compact.
Whether the burden rests on the parole authorities to demonstrate that a timely hearing was not possible because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control.
Holding
Yes, because the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control, irrespective of formal acceptance under the Interstate Compact.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on its prior holding in People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim, emphasizing that the parole authorities bear the burden of proving they could not conduct timely hearings because the parolee was not under their control. The court stated that “the burden rests upon the parole authorities in every instance in which timely hearings have not been held to demonstrate that they were unable to do so because the parolee was not subject to their convenience and practical control. A presumption alone cannot satisfy that burden.” The court rejected the argument that formal acceptance of supervision under the Interstate Compact was a prerequisite for triggering the duty to provide a timely hearing. The critical factor is whether the parolee was, in reality, subject to the convenience and practical control of New York parole authorities. Because no final judgement had been issued against the petitioner before Gonzales was handed down, Gonzales thus controls. The case was remitted to determine whether, despite the lack of formal Interstate Compact supervision, Wilson was nonetheless subject to New York’s control while incarcerated in Connecticut. This decision ensures that parolees are not denied their right to a timely hearing simply because of their incarceration in another state, placing the onus on parole authorities to actively demonstrate their inability to act promptly.