Ricketson v. Village of Scarsdale, 56 N.Y.2d 535 (1982)

A cause of action for slander accrues upon utterance, and a subsequent reutterance does not restart the statute of limitations for the initial utterance; additionally, a summary judgment motion can be defeated by an affidavit explaining why direct evidence is unavailable, provided a reasonable excuse is given.

Summary

This case concerns a slander action where the plaintiff, Ricketson, alleged two instances of slander by the defendant, the Village of Scarsdale. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the second instance of slander revived the statute of limitations for the first and whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The court held that the statute of limitations barred the claim for the first instance of slander, but the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff was sufficient to overcome the summary judgment motion regarding the second instance. The court emphasized the importance of timely filing and the acceptance of reasonable excuses for failing to present direct evidence.

Facts

Ricketson alleged that the Village of Scarsdale slandered him on two separate occasions: in November 1979 and on February 9, 1980. Ricketson commenced an action on February 2, 1981. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claim based on the November 1979 statement. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Chatfield, who claimed Ricketson’s name, the occasion for the interview with Ricketson,. the substance of the slander Ricketson told Chatfield he had heard the defendant utter and, most important, which explained, on Chatfield’s direct knowledge, that Ricketson now refused to give an affidavit as to these facts (thereby supplying acceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissible form).

Procedural History

Ricketson filed suit against the Village of Scarsdale. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Appellate Division’s order was modified. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order pursuant to rule 500.2(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2[g]), modified the order with costs to the plaintiff, and affirmed it as modified.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the alleged reutterance of the slander on February 9, 1980, restarted the statute of limitations for the initial slanderous statement made in November 1979.

2. Whether the affidavit submitted by Chatfield was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion.

Holding

1. No, because the reutterance measured the time within which an action could be brought based on that utterance, but did not restart the time running anew for the one that occurred the previous November.

2. Yes, because Chatfield’s affidavit indicated Ricketson’s name, the occasion for the interview with Ricketson,. the substance of the slander Ricketson told Chatfield he had heard the defendant utter and, most important, which explained, on Chatfield’s direct knowledge, that Ricketson now refused to give an affidavit as to these facts (thereby supplying acceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissible form).

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the one-year statute of limitations (CPLR 215, subd. 3) barred the slander claim from November 1979 because the action was commenced on February 2, 1981, more than a year after the initial statement. The court clarified that each instance of slander creates a new cause of action with its own statute of limitations. The second utterance in February 1980 provided a basis for a timely claim, but it did not revive the expired claim from November 1979. Regarding the summary judgment motion, the court found that Chatfield’s affidavit provided a sufficient excuse for not presenting direct evidence in admissible form. The affidavit explained that Ricketson refused to provide an affidavit confirming the slander, and Chatfield’s direct knowledge of the circumstances validated the excuse. The court cited Friends of Animals v. Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 N.Y.2d 1065, 1067-1068, emphasizing that a reasonable excuse for failing to meet strict evidentiary requirements is acceptable to defeat a summary judgment motion.