People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335 (1982)

A defendant’s spontaneous statement to an attorney, overheard by a police officer, is admissible if the statement was not the product of interrogation and was not intended to be confidential due to the presence of third parties.

Summary

Jean Harris was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of Dr. Herman Tarnower. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement she made to her attorney over the phone, which was overheard by a police officer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statement was spontaneous, not the result of police interrogation, and was not protected by attorney-client privilege because it was made in the presence of a third party and a police officer. The court also addressed issues related to rebuttal evidence and the denial of a motion to close pretrial hearings.

Facts

Jean Harris was accused of intentionally killing Dr. Herman Tarnower, her former lover, out of jealousy. After her arrest, Harris was read her Miranda rights, waived them, and made statements to the police. She requested to call an attorney. While making the call in a room with a police officer and another person present, Harris stated, “Oh, my God, I think I’ve killed Hy.” This statement was admitted into evidence at trial.

Procedural History

Harris was convicted of second-degree murder and weapons possession. She appealed, arguing that the admission of her statement to her attorney, as well as other trial errors, warranted reversal. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction. She then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the admission into evidence of a statement made by the defendant to her attorney, overheard by a police officer, violated her right to counsel or the attorney-client privilege.

2. Whether the prosecution’s use of certain evidence in rebuttal denied the defendant a fair trial.

3. Whether the denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude the press from pretrial hearings denied her a fair trial.

4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to exercise a peremptory challenge to a sworn juror based on information acquired after the juror was sworn.

Holding

1. No, because the statement was spontaneous and not the product of an interrogation environment, and the communication was not intended to be confidential due to the presence of third parties.

2. No, because the rebuttal evidence was offered to contradict the defendant’s testimony and disprove her alternate state of mind.

3. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the failure to close the pretrial proceedings.

4. No, because CPL 270.15 specifically states the circumstances under which a juror, once sworn, may be challenged for cause, and those circumstances were not met.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of police interrogation after the right to counsel had been invoked. The court emphasized that the police had honored Harris’s request to speak with an attorney. The court noted, “it must ‘be shown that they were in no way the product of an ‘interrogation environment’, the result of ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent’” (People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d 648, 650). Further, the attorney-client privilege did not apply because the statement was made in the known presence of a police officer and another person, indicating a lack of intent to keep the communication confidential. Regarding the rebuttal evidence, the court found it was proper to contradict Harris’s testimony about her phone conversation with the victim. The court cited Marshall v. Davies, 78 NY 414, 420, stating that rebutting evidence is “evidence in denial of some affirmative fact which the answering party has endeavored to prove”. The court also found that the denial of the motion to close pretrial hearings did not prejudice Harris because the information was already public. Finally, the court held that the trial court properly denied the request to exercise a peremptory challenge against a sworn juror based on information learned after the juror was sworn, because challenges after swearing are limited by statute to challenges for cause. The court stated that the defense had not demonstrated that “such a relationship between the juror and the Assistant District Attorney as rendered the juror unsuitable for service”.