People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152 (1982)

A sentencing court cannot delegate its statutory responsibility to determine the amount and manner of restitution to a probation department; while the probation department can provide recommendations, the final decision rests solely with the court.

Summary

Patricia Fuller was convicted of grand larceny for unlawfully receiving public assistance. The sentencing court imposed probation and ordered restitution, delegating to the Probation Department the determination of the amount and manner of payment. The Probation Department then required Fuller to sign a confession of judgment for an amount exceeding that covered by the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the sentencing court’s delegation of authority to the Probation Department was improper. While a probation department may provide recommendations, the court alone must determine the restitution amount and payment terms. The court also rejected Fuller’s claim that a 21-month delay between the discovery of the crime and her arrest violated her due process rights.

Facts

Patricia Fuller unlawfully received $5,994 in public assistance from September 1973 to December 1975 by concealing her employment. The Social Services Department discovered this in December 1975 but did not inform the District Attorney until December 1976. Fuller was arrested on September 20, 1977.

Procedural History

Fuller unsuccessfully moved pretrial to dismiss the charges based on a due process violation due to the delay between the discovery of the crime and her arrest. She then pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court sentenced her to probation and ordered restitution, directing the Probation Department to determine the amount and manner of restitution. Fuller appealed, challenging the delegation of authority and the pre-arrest delay. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a sentencing court may delegate the power to fix the conditions of restitution or reparation to the Probation Department.

2. Whether the 21-month lapse between the discovery of the defendant’s criminal conduct and her arrest violated her due process right to prompt prosecution.

Holding

1. No, because the statutes vest the responsibility for determining restitution solely with the sentencing court.

2. No, because the delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances and did not prejudice the defendant.

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the restitution order, the court emphasized the statutory language of Penal Law §§ 60.27 and 65.10, which repeatedly refers to the “court” making findings, conducting hearings, and fixing the amount and manner of restitution. The court noted, “Perhaps above all, it is manifest that the Legislature’s intention was to keep the responsibility for dealing with this increasingly emphasized feature of sentencing in the hands of our Judges and no one else.” The court acknowledged that the Probation Department could act as a fact-finder and submit recommendations, but the ultimate decision rests with the court. The court cited People v Julye, 64 A.D.2d 614 and People v Thigpen, 60 A.D.2d 860, supporting the non-delegation principle.

Regarding the delay in prosecution, the court acknowledged that an unexplained and unreasonable delay could violate due process, citing People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241. However, the 21-month delay was within the statutory period, and 12 months were attributable to the Social Services Department’s investigation before informing the District Attorney. The court stated that “notice to such an agency, whose societal concerns are so different from those of the police department and the District Attorney, need not be regarded as notice to the criminal justice system.” The court also found no convincing evidence of prejudice to the defendant.

The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for resentencing, instructing the Supreme Court to determine the restitution amount itself.