Matter of Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 815 (1979)
When a statute requires a public official to act “not later than” a specified time, the provision is generally mandatory, especially when the purpose is to protect private parties from unreasonable delay and the official retains power to act further.
Summary
Parkchester Apartments Co. sought review of an Attorney General’s determination regarding rent increases. The central issue was whether the Attorney General’s action, taken after the 30-day period specified in General Business Law § 352-e(2), was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the 30-day limit was mandatory in this case because it was intended to protect property owners from unreasonable delays by the Attorney General, and the Attorney General retained the power to take further action even after the 30-day period. The court emphasized that the statute’s remedial objectives and the protection of property owners weighed in favor of a mandatory interpretation.
Facts
Parkchester Apartments Co. filed a submission with the Attorney General concerning proposed rent increases. General Business Law § 352-e(2) required the Attorney General to act on such filings “not later than thirty days after…filing.” The Attorney General acted after this 30-day period. Parkchester argued that the Attorney General’s action was therefore invalid.
Procedural History
The case reached the Appellate Division, which ruled in favor of Parkchester. The Attorney General appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that the Attorney General’s action was untimely and invalid.
Issue(s)
Whether the statutory requirement in General Business Law § 352-e(2) that the Attorney General act “not later than thirty days after…filing” is a mandatory or directory requirement.
Holding
No, because where the Attorney-General is not foreclosed by filing from further action protective of the public interests and the purpose of the time limitation is to protect the property owner against unreasonable delay, the statute is properly construed to be mandatory, rather than directory.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the interpretation of the phrase “not later than” depends on the statute’s objectives. While it can be directory in some contexts, it is mandatory when the statute aims to protect a specific party from unreasonable delay and the public official retains the power to act even after the deadline. The court distinguished this case from situations where the time limit is primarily for the agency’s internal efficiency or to protect the public interest, noting, “although the phrase ‘not later than’ may, when viewed against the remedial objectives of the statute in which the phrase appears, be construed to be directory only… where, as here, the Attorney-General is not foreclosed by filing from further action protective of the public interests and the purpose of the time limitation is to protect the property owner against unreasonable delay, the statute is properly construed to be mandatory, rather than directory.” The court found that the 30-day limit in General Business Law § 352-e(2) was intended to protect property owners like Parkchester from potential delays by the Attorney General, thus making the time limit mandatory. The court cited Matter of Whalen v Lefkowitz, 36 NY2d 75, 78 in support of this reasoning.