People v. Guido, 56 N.Y.2d 305 (1982)

A statement containing a warning that false statements are punishable under Penal Law § 210.45 satisfies the constitutional requirement that warrants be supported by “oath or affirmation,” even if the statement is not formally sworn.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that an unsworn statement containing a warning that false statements are punishable as a misdemeanor under Penal Law § 210.45 satisfies the constitutional “oath or affirmation” requirement for issuing a search warrant. Police obtained a warrant to search Guido’s residence based on an affidavit and an unsworn statement from an informant, Colarusso, that included the statutory warning. The Court reasoned that this form notice served as the functional equivalent of a traditional oath, adequately safeguarding against perjury, and thus the warrant was valid. This decision emphasizes a practical approach to constitutional requirements, acknowledging the effectiveness of statutory warnings in ensuring truthfulness.

Facts

Officer Liptak applied for a warrant to search Mark Guido’s residence, submitting his own sworn affidavit and an attached statement from informant Anthony Colarusso. Colarusso’s statement, while unsworn, detailed his observations of marijuana at Guido’s house. The statement included a warning: “False statements made herein are punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor pursuant to section 210.45 of the Penal Law.” Guido was later indicted for criminal possession of marijuana after a search pursuant to the warrant revealed a large quantity of marijuana, currency, and pills.

Procedural History

The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was defective because Colarusso’s statement was not sworn. The trial court denied the motion. Guido pleaded guilty to a reduced charge after the denial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a search warrant is statutorily and constitutionally defective when issued based on an unsworn statement containing a warning that false statements are punishable under Penal Law § 210.45.
2. Whether the papers submitted in support of the warrant application established the reliability of the informant Colarusso to the degree necessary to establish probable cause.

Holding

1. No, because the statement containing the warning under Penal Law § 210.45 serves as the procedural and functional equivalent of a traditional oath or affirmation.
2. Unnecessary to reach, because the informant’s statement was based on his own personal observations establishing probable cause, making the traditional reliability test unnecessary.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court addressed the constitutional requirement that warrants be “supported by oath or affirmation.” It acknowledged that CPL 690.35 requires warrant applications to be sworn, but the statute doesn’t define the form or verification method for supporting depositions. The Court reasoned that while a formal oath is typical, it is not the only way to satisfy the constitutional requirement. The court stated that “a method of verification by which the maker of the statement is first alerted to the criminal consequences of knowingly providing false information in connection with a warrant application and then voluntarily acknowledges his acceptance of those consequences should suffice for purposes of the constitutional mandate that a warrant be issued upon proof ‘supported by oath or affirmation’.” The Court emphasized that Penal Law § 210.45 provides a convenient method for ensuring truthfulness without requiring a notary. The form notice alerts the signer to the possibility of criminal prosecution for false statements, potentially providing greater assurance against misstatements than a routine oath. Because Colarusso’s statement was based on his own personal observations and contained sufficient factual information to establish probable cause, the court found it unnecessary to assess Colarusso’s reliability under Aguilar v. Texas. The court further reasoned that the police court justice’s off-the-record discussion with Officer Liptak did not invalidate the warrant because it didn’t raise doubts about Colarusso’s reliability.