Eaton v. Town of Islip, 43 N.Y.2d 879 (1978)
A zoning ordinance that deprives a property owner of all practical use of their land is confiscatory and requires just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.
Summary
Eaton sought to rebuild her house, which was destroyed by a storm, but was denied a building permit due to a town ordinance restricting construction in the “Dune District” to pedestrian dune crossings or fences. Eaton challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional, arguing it deprived her of all practical use of her property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, was confiscatory because it deprived her of any reasonable use without just compensation, violating due process.
Facts
In 1958, Eaton’s house was built on her property. On February 6, 1978, a violent storm washed the house out to sea. Eaton applied for a building permit to rebuild, but was denied because of Section 68-59.1 of the Town Code of Islip (the “Dune District” ordinance). The ordinance restricted construction in the Dune District to “an elevated pedestrian dune crossing or a fence of a type approved by the Town of Islip which is designed to hold or increase the dune”.
Procedural History
Eaton initiated an action challenging the denial of the permit. Both the lower courts found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Eaton’s property. The Town of Islip appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the Town of Islip’s Dune District ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, thereby constituting a confiscatory taking requiring just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.
Holding
Yes, because the ordinance restricted construction to uses that deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, rendering the restriction confiscatory and requiring just compensation.
Court’s Reasoning
The court found that the Town failed to provide sufficient evidence to dispute the lower courts’ determination that the ordinance deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property. The court emphasized that the permissible uses under the ordinance (pedestrian dune crossing or a specific type of fence) did not allow Eaton to use the property in a way to which it was reasonably adapted. The court stated, “The restriction is, therefore, confiscatory and thus would work such a substantial deprivation of plaintiff’s use of her property, without just compensation, as to violate the due process clauses of our Federal and State.Constitutions.” The court distinguished the town’s right to regulate land for public safety (ecology, safeguarding life and property) from its obligation to provide just compensation when such regulation amounts to a taking. The court acknowledged the town’s valid interest in preserving the ecology of the dunes, stating: “The issue is not whether the town may constitutionally so restrict plaintiff’s land ‘to preserve the ecology of the dunes and grasses and by doing so to safeguard life and property’, but whether it can do so without according plaintiff just compensation. We agree that it cannot.” The court dismissed the argument that a prior offer from the federal government to purchase the property negated the confiscatory effect of the ordinance because the narrowly restricted uses remained.