56 N.Y.2d 950 (1982)

An application to file a late notice of claim against a municipality may be made after the commencement of an action, but no more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled.

Summary

These three consolidated cases concern the interpretation of General Municipal Law § 50-e regarding the filing of late notices of claim against the City of New York. The Court of Appeals held that an application for an extension to file a late notice of claim may be made before or after the commencement of the action, but it must be made within one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled. Permitting an extension after the statute of limitations has run would effectively allow the court to grant an extension exceeding the statute of limitations, which is expressly prohibited by the statute. Once the limitations period expires, any claim is barred.

Facts

The cases consolidated in this appeal each involved the question of whether a late notice of claim against the City of New York was permissible under General Municipal Law § 50-e. The specific facts of each case are not detailed in the court’s memorandum decision, but the core issue revolved around the timeliness of the application for leave to file a late notice of claim relative to the statute of limitations.

Procedural History

The procedural history is not detailed for each individual case but is summarized by the court’s resolution. The lower courts had apparently allowed late notices of claim in situations where the application was made outside the one year and 90-day window following the accrual of the cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed those decisions, clarifying the permissible timeframe for such applications.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the 1976 amendments to General Municipal Law § 50-e permit a court to grant an application to file a late notice of claim after the Statute of Limitations has run.
2. In Moore v. City of New York, whether the statutory period began to run only when the plaintiff discovered that her building had been destroyed.

Holding

1. No, because permitting a court to grant an extension after the Statute of Limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the Statute of Limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50-e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so.
2. No, demolishing a building located on a city street cannot be fairly characterized as a surreptitious act akin to embezzlement, nor can it be said that the building after its removal is comparable to a hidden object.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the 1976 amendments to General Municipal Law § 50-e were intended to relax the restrictive features of the old statute but not to abandon the requirement that the application be made within a specified and relatively short period. The court emphasized that allowing extensions after the statute of limitations would render meaningless the portion of the statute prohibiting such extensions. The court directly referenced Professor Graziano’s study, stating that even with the liberalizing amendments, “applications under subdivision 5 of section 50-e must still be made within one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based.” The final version simply extended that period by an additional 90 days.

Regarding the discovery rule argument in Moore v. City of New York, the Court rejected the notion that the statute of limitations should be tolled until the plaintiff discovered the destruction of her building. The Court distinguished the demolition of a building on a city street from a surreptitious act, finding no basis to apply a discovery rule in this context.

The Court underscored the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines and avoiding interpretations that would undermine the clear legislative intent. The Court noted that while calls for broader reform are often met by more modest revisions on the part of the Legislature, the existing statute should be followed.