Getty Oil Company v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 51 N.Y.2d 905 (1980)
Evidence of motive and incendiary origin, even if circumstantial, can be sufficient to defeat an insured’s motion for summary judgment in an action on a fire insurance policy.
Summary
Getty Oil Company sued Hartford Fire Insurance Company to recover under a fire insurance policy. Hartford argued that the fire was the result of arson. Getty moved for summary judgment, which was initially denied but later granted by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hartford presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of motive and incendiary origin to warrant a trial on the merits. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s attorney’s affidavit detailing the police sergeant’s findings, although hearsay, was sufficient under CPLR 3212(f) to justify denying summary judgment, especially given the timing of the motion on the eve of trial.
Facts
Getty Oil Company sought to recover under a fire insurance policy issued by Hartford Fire Insurance Company after a fire occurred at Getty’s premises.
Getty’s president testified that the company was in a desperate financial condition, suggesting a potential motive for arson.
The president also stated that there were no containers on the premises when he locked up the night before the fire.
A police sergeant found a glass container inside the premises after the fire that the president had never seen before, suggesting an incendiary origin.
Procedural History
Getty Oil Company sued Hartford Fire Insurance Company in September 1976.
Getty moved for summary judgment in March 1979, after Hartford had made a CPLR 3216 demand (demand to resume prosecution of the case).
Special Term initially denied Getty’s motion for summary judgment.
The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Getty.
Hartford appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant’s evidence of motive and incendiary origin, presented primarily through an attorney’s affidavit detailing hearsay evidence, was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in a fire insurance claim.
Whether the Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff when the defendant had presented evidence suggesting arson, even if circumstantial.
Holding
Yes, because evidence of motive and incendiary origin, even circumstantial, is sufficient to defeat an insured’s motion for summary judgment in an action on its fire insurance policy.
Yes, because the defendant’s attorney’s affidavit was sufficient to invoke the protection of CPLR 3212(f), which allows for the denial of summary judgment when facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the deposition testimony of Getty’s president established the company’s desperate financial condition, thus providing a motive for arson. Combined with the discovery of an unfamiliar container inside the premises after the fire, this presented a circumstantial case for incendiary origin.
The Court relied on V.F.V. Constr. Co. v Aetna Ins. Co., 56 AD2d 598, which held that evidence of motive and incendiary origin without more is sufficient to defeat an insured’s motion for summary judgment in an action on its fire insurance policy.
The Court found that the affidavit of Hartford’s attorney, detailing the police sergeant’s findings as to the incendiary origin of the fire and explaining why an affidavit could not be obtained from the sergeant, was sufficient under CPLR 3212(f). This subdivision allows for the denial of summary judgment even when the opposing party relies on hearsay evidence, provided they demonstrate that essential facts exist but cannot be presented in admissible form at that time.
The Court emphasized that CPLR 3212(f) is intended to protect the party opposing the motion, especially when the motion is made on the eve of trial. Requiring the defendant to depose the police sergeant before trial would give the plaintiff an unfair disclosure advantage. The Court cited Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 187, 192, in support of this proposition.
The Court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in granting summary judgment and remitted the matter back to the Appellate Division to review the discretion exercised by Special Term in denying the motion.