56 N.Y.2d 284 (1982)
In a claim for violation of the right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, summary judgment is inappropriate where there is a factual dispute as to whether written consent to use a person’s name or likeness for advertising purposes was given, and parol evidence is admissible to clarify the intent behind an equivocal writing.
Summary
Mario Andretti, a race car driver, sued Rolex for using his name and picture in advertisements without his written consent, violating New York Civil Rights Law § 51. Andretti had accepted a Rolex watch and acknowledged membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing, also sending a signed photo to the Rolex president. The issue was whether this membership constituted consent for Rolex to use his likeness in advertisements. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment to Andretti. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a factual issue existed regarding the scope of Andretti’s consent, and parol evidence could be used to clarify his intent, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Facts
Mario Andretti was a well-known race car driver. Rolex published two advertisements featuring Andretti’s name and picture. Andretti had previously accepted a Rolex watch and acknowledged his membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing. He also sent a photograph of himself to the president of Rolex with a handwritten inscription indicating his pleasure at being a member of the “Rolex Club”. Andretti claimed he never gave written consent for Rolex to use his name and likeness in advertisements, as required by New York Civil Rights Law § 51.
Procedural History
Andretti sued Rolex in the Supreme Court, seeking damages under Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law. The Supreme Court denied Andretti’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted Andretti’s motion for partial summary judgment. Rolex appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether summary judgment is appropriate when there is a factual dispute regarding the scope of written consent to use a person’s name and likeness in advertising, and whether parol evidence is admissible to clarify the intent behind the written consent.
Holding
No, because a factual issue exists as to what membership in the Rolex Club entailed, i.e., whether plaintiff thereby consented to the use of his name and likeness in Rolex advertisements. Summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability was therefore improper.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires prior written consent for the use of an individual’s name or likeness for advertising purposes. While Andretti acknowledged his membership in the “Rolex Club” in writing and sent a signed photo to Rolex, the court found that it was unclear whether this membership encompassed consent to use his name and likeness in advertisements. The court stated that “Factual issues exist as to what membership in the Rolex Club entailed, i.e., whether plaintiff thereby consented to the use of his name and likeness in Rolex advertisements.” The court emphasized that parol evidence may be introduced to establish that an equivocal writing signed by the subject of the photograph was intended as the expression of consent contemplated by the statute to the use of the name. Therefore, because there was a factual dispute regarding the scope of Andretti’s consent, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court referenced Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 439 to support its determination of the law.