Williams v. State Division for Youth, 417 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1980)
Upon sentencing, juvenile offenders must be promptly transferred to the custody of the New York State Division for Youth (DFY) for confinement in a secure DFY facility.
Summary
This case concerns the statutory obligation of the New York State Division for Youth (DFY) to accept juvenile offenders into its custody immediately upon sentencing. The plaintiffs argued that DFY was delaying the transfer of sentenced juveniles. The Court of Appeals held that DFY has a legal duty to promptly accept juvenile offenders, and that a 10-day limit for transfer is generally reasonable, but modified the lower court’s injunctive relief to a declaratory judgment, finding the original order too broad given the circumstances.
Facts
The plaintiffs, juvenile offenders, were sentenced and awaiting transfer to DFY facilities. They claimed that DFY was unduly delaying their transfer. The trial court determined that DFY had a legal responsibility to provide facilities and place sentenced juvenile offenders in such facilities upon sentencing, and set a 10-day limit for the transfer. The Appellate Division upheld this determination.
Procedural History
The Trial Term granted injunctive relief ordering DFY to accept transfer of plaintiffs and all other juvenile offenders within 10 days of sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Term’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the New York State Division for Youth (DFY) has discretion regarding when to accept juvenile offenders into its custody after sentencing. Whether a 10-day limit for DFY to accept juvenile offenders after sentencing is appropriate.
Holding
1. No, because the statutory scheme requires immediate transfer of juvenile offenders to DFY custody upon sentencing. The term “forthwith” in CPL 430.20(1) means without delay.
2. Yes, because, on the record, the 10-day limit for transfer is not inappropriate, but this limit should yield in a particular case when there is a demonstrated need for flexibility.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the mandatory language of the statutes. CPL 430.20(1) states that “the defendant must forthwith be committed to the custody of the appropriate public servant.” Penal Law § 70.20(4) specifies that custody of a juvenile offender is “committed to … the director of the division for youth who shall arrange for the confinement of such offender in secure facilities of the division.” The court reasoned that the word “forthwith” means “without delay” and does not allow DFY discretion to delay transfer. The court noted that the trial court had introduced substantial evidence concerning the State’s capacity to receive sentenced juvenile offenders. The court found that existing DFY facilities were underused and could accommodate juvenile offenders held after sentence in the city facility. While upholding the 10-day limit, the court acknowledged that flexibility might be needed in specific cases with “exigent circumstances.” The court modified the Appellate Division order by deleting the injunctive relief and declaring that the State is obligated to transfer a juvenile offender to a DFY facility within 10 days of sentencing unless exigent circumstances justify a further limited delay. The court found the broad injunctive relief inappropriate because class certification was denied, and plaintiffs were already placed in DFY facilities. Declaratory relief was sufficient to establish the rights at issue.