People v. Richard M.M., 52 N.Y.2d 731 (1980): Guilty Plea Forfeits Right to Review Denial of Late Suppression Motion

People v. Richard M.M., 52 N.Y.2d 731 (1980)

A guilty plea, entered on advice of competent counsel, forfeits the right to appellate review of an order denying permission to make a late motion to suppress evidence and waives a claim of prior ineffective assistance of counsel if the subsequent attorney was aware of the prior attorney’s alleged errors and still advised the plea.

Summary

Richard M.M. was indicted on weapons charges after an allegedly illegal search. His initial attorney failed to file a timely suppression motion. Substitute counsel, aware of this failure, sought permission to file a late motion, which was initially granted but later denied. M.M. then pleaded guilty. The New York Court of Appeals held that the guilty plea forfeited M.M.’s right to appellate review of the denial of the late suppression motion and waived his claim of ineffective assistance of the original counsel, because the second attorney knew of the alleged errors and still advised the plea.

Facts

Following a shooting incident, police conducted a search, leading to a 45-count indictment against Richard M.M. for weapons violations. The People served notice of intent to use M.M.’s statements at trial. M.M.’s first attorney, who was also representing him on a manslaughter charge stemming from the same incident, failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search or M.M.’s statements. After M.M. was convicted of manslaughter (later reversed), he obtained new counsel who discovered the unaddressed weapons charges. The new attorney attempted to file a late suppression motion.

Procedural History

The County Court initially granted M.M.’s motion for permission to file a late suppression motion. However, the District Attorney sought reargument, and a different judge of the same court granted reargument and denied the motion. M.M. then pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. M.M. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a guilty plea forfeits the right to appellate review of a denial of permission to file a late suppression motion.

2. Whether a guilty plea, entered on the advice of competent counsel, waives a claim of ineffective assistance of prior counsel, when the subsequent attorney was aware of the alleged deficiencies.

Holding

1. Yes, because the right to appeal after a guilty plea is preserved only for orders “finally denying a motion to suppress evidence,” and the denial of permission to file a *late* motion is not the same as a denial of the motion to suppress itself.

2. Yes, because the second attorney was fully aware of the alleged errors by the first attorney and still advised M.M. to plead guilty; therefore, the plea was not “infected by any ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.70(2) only preserves the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence after a guilty plea. The denial of permission to file a *late* suppression motion is a separate issue, focused on whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to make the motion earlier, and not on the merits of the suppression claim itself. Therefore, the statutory exception does not apply.

Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court emphasized that M.M.’s substitute counsel was aware of the prior attorney’s failure to file a suppression motion and, despite this knowledge, advised M.M. to plead guilty. The court found no indication that the second attorney’s advice was incompetent. The court reasoned, “In this instance it cannot be said that any ineffective assistance of counsel vitiated defendant’s plea of guilty premised as it was on advice of counsel (as to which there is now no suggestion of incompetency) comprehending, inter alia, the very claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that defendant now urges on us.” The court further suggested that “even if there were but one attorney, if the ineffective assistance of counsel did not infect the plea bargaining process itself, the defendant, having admitted commission of the criminal act by his guilty plea, should be held to have forfeited any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not directly involved in the plea bargaining process.”