People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982)
Under the New York State Constitution, a suspect does not have the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that suspects do not have a right to counsel at investigatory lineups under the state constitution, provided the lineup occurs before formal adversarial proceedings begin. The court reasoned that the benefits of counsel at this stage are outweighed by the policy considerations favoring prompt identification, such as preserving witness memory and quickly exonerating innocent suspects. This decision clarifies the scope of New York’s right to counsel, distinguishing it from the right during custodial interrogations.
Facts
Four separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a defendant who participated in a pre-accusatory lineup without counsel:
1. Laffosse: Convicted of robbery after being identified in a lineup. He requested an attorney during questioning but proceeded with the lineup after failing to secure one.
2. Johnson: Convicted of murder; he requested counsel just before the lineup, but it proceeded without an attorney.
3. Hawkins: Convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary after being identified in a lineup. He consented to the lineup without requesting counsel, despite having a pending drug charge.
4. Diaz: Convicted of sodomy and assault after being identified in a lineup; police were aware of unrelated charges against him but did not contact his attorney.
Procedural History
In all four cases, the defendants moved to suppress the lineup identifications based on a denial of the right to counsel. The trial courts denied the motions, and the defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the New York State Constitution provides a suspect with the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings.
Holding
No, because the benefits of requiring counsel at investigatory lineups are outweighed by policy considerations favoring prompt identification procedures, and the New York Constitution does not mandate counsel at this stage.
Court’s Reasoning
The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. The court then examined whether the New York State Constitution should be interpreted to provide greater protection. While New York has expanded the right to counsel in the context of custodial interrogations, the court found that the role of counsel at a lineup is more limited than during an interrogation. The court emphasized that, unlike interrogations where counsel actively advises the suspect, counsel at a lineup serves primarily as an observer. The court stated, “the need for and right to a lawyer at an identification lineup is insignificant compared to the need in an ensuing interrogation.” People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485.
The court also emphasized the importance of prompt lineups to preserve witness memory, benefit the suspect by diminishing mistaken identification, and aid police investigations. Requiring counsel at this stage could cause unreasonable delays, undermining these advantages. Although a suspect’s attorney may attend the lineup if they are already represented, police are not required to notify counsel or delay the lineup significantly to accommodate counsel’s arrival. The court found no basis in the State Constitution to mandate counsel at investigatory lineups. The court noted, “The Constitution does not expressly or even impliedly require it.”