People v. Smalls, 53 N.Y.2d 413 (1981)
The admission of a co-defendant’s confession that is not truly interlocking and implicates the defendant in the crime, coupled with an erroneous jury instruction on the presumption of intent, can constitute reversible error unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Summary
Defendants Smalls and McGee were convicted of felony murder. McGee’s confession, admitted at their joint trial, implicated Smalls as a knowing participant in the robbery, while Smalls’ own statement merely placed him at the scene without admitting to any criminal intent. The trial court also erroneously charged the jury on the presumption of intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Smalls’ conviction, finding that the admission of McGee’s confession violated Smalls’ right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States, and the error in the intent charge was not harmless. McGee’s conviction was affirmed because the court found the error in the intent charge to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of his intent.
Facts
Smalls and McGee, along with Mary Jenkins and Phillip Green, were involved in an attempted robbery of Pedro Pratt’s apartment. During the robbery, Pratt was shot and later died. McGee made statements to the police implicating himself and Smalls in the crime. Smalls also made statements, but these statements primarily placed him at the scene without explicitly admitting to participating in the robbery or being aware of its planning. Smalls’ motion to sever his trial from McGee’s was denied.
Procedural History
Smalls and McGee were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed their convictions. Smalls appealed, arguing that the admission of McGee’s confession violated his right to confrontation, as established in Bruton v. United States, and that the jury charge on intent was erroneous. The Court of Appeals reversed Smalls’ conviction and affirmed McGee’s conviction.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the admission of McGee’s confession at the joint trial violated Smalls’ right to confrontation, considering that McGee did not testify and Smalls’ own confession was not truly interlocking.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts.
Holding
1. Yes, because McGee’s confession implicated Smalls directly as a knowing participant in the robbery, while Smalls’ statement merely placed him at the scene. This discrepancy made the confessions not truly interlocking, violating Smalls’ right to confront witnesses against him.
2. Yes, the charge was erroneous, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to McGee. As to Smalls, the Court did not determine if it was harmless, as his conviction was reversed on other grounds.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the Bruton rule, which prohibits the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that implicates the defendant, was violated because McGee’s confession directly implicated Smalls, while Smalls’ statement did not admit to the crime. The Court found that the statements were not truly “interlocking” because of the significant difference in their content regarding Smalls’ participation and intent. The Court stated, “the danger is great that the jury might have resolved these ambiguities by reference-to McGee’s statement and its indication that Smalls was informed of the details of the robbery.” This error was deemed not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence against Smalls was not overwhelming.
Regarding the jury charge on intent, the Court acknowledged that such a charge was erroneous under Sandstrom v. Montana. However, the Court held that a harmless error analysis is proper where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s intent. The Court found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to McGee because there was overwhelming evidence of his intent to commit the robbery, citing McGee’s planning of the robbery with Jenkins and Green, and his own statements indicating his intent. The court noted, “a person is presumed to intend that which he actually does,” was an incorrect statement of law.