People v. Kurtz, 51 N.Y.2d 380 (1980)
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution when a prior acquittal was based on an erroneous legal ruling and not on a review of the facts.
Summary
Kurtz was charged with first and second-degree assault. The jury acquitted him on the first-degree assault charge but deadlocked on the second-degree assault charge. The trial judge, believing acquittal on the first count necessitated acquittal on the second, ordered an acquittal on the second count. The District Attorney successfully moved to vacate the acquittal order, and Kurtz sought to prevent retrial via a writ of prohibition, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the initial acquittal was based on a legal error, not a factual determination, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on the second-degree assault charge.
Facts
Kurtz was indicted on two counts of assault: first-degree (intentionally causing serious physical injury) and second-degree (recklessly causing serious physical injury). The jury deliberated for two days, eventually reporting a deadlock but agreement on one unidentified charge. The jury then reported a verdict of not guilty on the first count and no verdict on the second count. The trial judge sent the jury back for further deliberations after noting some ambiguity in their note.
The jury reiterated its not guilty verdict on the first count and deadlock on the second. The court then discharged the jury without objection from either counsel and subsequently ordered an acquittal on the second count, erroneously believing the acquittal on the first count necessitated the same result on the second. The prosecution’s attempts to object or clarify were cut short by the judge.
Procedural History
The trial court initially declared an acquittal on the second count after the jury deadlocked. The District Attorney then successfully moved to vacate this order. Kurtz then commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent retrial, arguing double jeopardy. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, holding that the trial judge’s order was based on a mistake of law, not a determination of fact. Kurtz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial judge’s ruling, denominated an “acquittal” on the second count of assault, constituted an order that foreclosed further prosecution of Kurtz on that count under the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
Holding
No, because the “acquittal” was erroneously entered as a matter of law and was not founded on an adjudication of the facts; therefore, it does not bar vacating that order and retrying Kurtz on the second count.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the prohibitions against double jeopardy in both the Federal and State Constitutions preclude retrial only after a determination going to factual innocence. While the term “acquit” generally implies a determination based on factual grounds, the court must examine the true nature of the decree in light of all the circumstances. Quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978), the court noted that “the mere use of that word will not preclude a reviewing court from ascertaining the true nature of the decree in light of all the circumstances.”
A new trial is permissible if the dismissal or acquittal does not amount to an adjudication on the facts, even if jeopardy has attached. Here, the trial judge ordered the acquittal on the second count solely because of his mistaken belief that the verdict on the first count required it. This was a legal determination, not a factual one. As the court stated, “Under no reasonable view can it be said that the Judge ruled for petitioner on the basis of a review of the facts.” Therefore, vacating the order and retrying Kurtz did not violate double jeopardy principles.