Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982)
When a driver is faced with a sudden and unexpected emergency, the standard of care remains that of a reasonable person under the circumstances, but the emergency is a factor in determining what is reasonable; furthermore, illegally double-parking can establish proximate cause if it obstructs visibility and maneuverability, contributing to an accident.
Summary
Malikah Ferrer, a four-year-old, was struck by a car driven by Ben Harris and owned by Ben and Anna Harris, as she crossed a street to an ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. The court addressed whether the evidence supported findings of negligence against both the Harrises and Javidan, and whether the Harrises were entitled to a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine. The court found sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury against all defendants but held the Harrises were entitled to an emergency charge. The Court also considered the admissibility of the mother’s instructions to her daughter regarding street crossing safety.
Facts
Malikah Ferrer, accompanied by her older sister, crossed Walton Avenue in the Bronx to reach a “Mister Softee” ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. As Malikah crossed from between parked cars, she was hit by a vehicle driven by Ben Harris. Harris knew the area and was aware children were likely to be present. He testified he was driving 15-20 mph and stopped within four feet, claiming the child ran into his car door. Plaintiffs argued Harris failed to sound his horn and that the impact point on the car and the child’s injuries contradicted Harris’s account. Javidan’s truck was illegally double-parked, obstructing visibility and forcing Harris closer to parked cars.
Procedural History
The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the Harrises (75% liability) and Javidan (25% liability). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Harrises appealed based on the denial of their motion to dismiss and the refusal to give an emergency doctrine jury instruction. Javidan appealed by leave of the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.
Issue(s)
1. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence against Ben and Anna Harris.
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine concerning Ben Harris’s conduct.
3. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence and proximate cause against Hassan Javidan.
4. Whether the admission of testimony regarding the mother’s safety instructions to her daughters was prejudicial error.
Holding
1. Yes, because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether Ben Harris was negligent under the circumstances.
2. Yes, because the jury could have reasonably concluded that Harris was faced with a sudden emergency, and the trial court should have provided guidance on the applicable law regarding the emergency doctrine.
3. Yes, because Javidan’s illegal double-parking violated traffic regulations and proximately caused the accident by obstructing visibility and maneuverability.
4. Yes, because there was no foundation laid to establish that these instructions were a persistent habit and further, parental supervision is not imputable to the child.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the determination of negligence is fact-specific and best suited for a jury’s consideration. Regarding the Harrises, the court found that while the evidence presented a question of fact as to whether Ben Harris was negligent, the jury should have been instructed on the emergency doctrine. The Court emphasized that “when one is confronted with a sudden and unexpected event or combination of events which leave little or no time for reflection or deliberate judgment, this itself may be a significant circumstance which, realistically as well as conceptually, should enter into the determination of the reasonableness of the choice of action pursued.” The failure to provide this instruction was reversible error. Regarding Javidan, the Court found that his violation of the traffic regulation against double-parking was evidence of negligence, citing Somersall v. New York Tel. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 157, 166. The Court also found that Javidan’s double-parking was a proximate cause of the accident because “but for the van’s unlawful double-parking, the Harris car would not have had to travel as close to the automobiles parked on the east side of the street, thus affording its operator an opportunity for a more wide-angled, more distant and earlier view of the child.” Finally, the Court addressed the evidentiary issue, finding the testimony about the mother’s safety instructions inadmissible because no foundation was laid to demonstrate a persistent habit, citing Halloran v. Virginia Chems., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 392-393, and such supervision is not imputable to the child.