In re Estate of Brandon, 55 N.Y.2d 206 (1982): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Prove Intent

In re Estate of Brandon, 55 N.Y.2d 206 (1982)

Evidence of prior similar acts is admissible to prove intent or the absence of mistake, but the degree of similarity required depends on whether the evidence is used to prove intent or the existence of a common scheme or plan.

Summary

In a discovery proceeding to recover property allegedly obtained through fraud and undue influence, the New York Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of evidence of prior judgments against one of the appellants for similar conduct with other elderly individuals. The Court held that while the evidence was improperly admitted under the “common scheme or plan” exception, because there was no direct connection between the acts, it was admissible to show intent, as the prior acts were sufficiently similar to negate an innocent state of mind. The Court affirmed the lower court’s order directing the appellants to return the improperly obtained assets from the decedent’s estate.

Facts

Alice Brandon, a frugal 75-year-old widow with terminal cancer, moved into Ann Murphy’s home, adjacent to the Friendly Acres Home for Adults, paying $600/month for room and board. Over the next eight months, Ms. Brandon became dependent on Mrs. Murphy, and her personality changed drastically. She began giving Mrs. Murphy large “gifts,” including money to purchase a Mercedes-Benz and finance a trip to Florida. Nearly $130,000 was transferred from Ms. Brandon’s accounts, reducing her net worth from $150,000 to $35,000 by the time of her death less than a year later. The executrix of Brandon’s estate initiated a proceeding to recover these assets, alleging fraud and undue influence.

Procedural History

The executrix brought a discovery proceeding in Surrogate’s Court. Over objection, the Surrogate allowed the executrix to introduce evidence of two prior judgments against Mrs. Murphy for similar conduct with other elderly individuals. The jury found that the appellants had obtained a significant portion of Brandon’s estate through fraud and undue influence, and the Surrogate entered a decree directing the return of the assets. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the prior judgments admissible as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the Surrogate Court erred in admitting evidence of two prior judgments decreeing that one of the appellants had engaged in fraud and undue influence in obtaining property from two other elderly individuals.

Holding

No, because although the evidence was improperly admitted under the common scheme or plan exception, it was admissible to show intent, and the appellants did not object to the jury charge limiting the use of the evidence to the issue of intent.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule against proving an act by showing similar acts on other occasions, but recognized exceptions for motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme/plan, and identity. The Court distinguished between the intent exception and the common scheme or plan exception. For intent, the focus is on the actor’s state of mind, and the key is the degree of similarity between the acts, not their connection. The court quoted Wigmore, stating: “the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Conversely, the common scheme or plan exception requires a clear connection between the acts, demonstrating a common purpose. The court emphasized the difference by quoting Wigmore again: “But where the very act is the object of proof, and is desired to be inferred from a plan or system, the combination of common features that will suggest a common plan as their explanation involves so much higher a grade of similarity as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test.”

In this case, the Court found no direct connection between the Sullivan-Metz incidents and the Brandon case, making the common scheme or plan exception inapplicable. However, the Court found that the evidence was admissible on the issue of intent because in all three situations, Mrs. Murphy brought elderly and infirm individuals into her home, gained their trust, and then stripped them of their life savings. Though these acts occurred over a period of years, the court determined that the prior acts were not so remote in time that the potential for prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence on the issue of intent. The court noted that the Surrogate ultimately instructed the jury to only consider the evidence of prior judgments to determine intent. Because no objection was made to that charge, the issue could not be raised for the first time before the Court of Appeals.