People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42 (1981)

A defendant’s spontaneous and unprovoked bribe offer to a police officer, made after requesting counsel, is admissible, and statements made in response to inquiries legitimately related to the bribe offer are not protected by the right to counsel rule.

Summary

Middleton was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After receiving Miranda warnings and requesting counsel, he offered a bribe to the arresting officer. The officer questioned him about the bribe, leading to Middleton admitting to having cocaine in his car. A search revealed the cocaine, and Middleton was charged with possession and bribery. The New York Court of Appeals held that the bribe offer was admissible despite the prior request for counsel because it was spontaneous and constituted a new crime. Inquiries directly related to the bribe offer were also admissible, and the admission of cocaine possession provided probable cause for its seizure.

Facts

Patrolman O’Connor and Sergeant Kelly stopped Middleton for driving without a front license plate. A computer check revealed six license suspensions. After being arrested and given Miranda warnings, Middleton asked his wife to call his attorney. He then offered O’Connor $5,000 plus another $5,000 to drop the charges. When Kelly returned, Middleton, in response to questioning about the bribe, admitted to having cocaine in his car and revealed its location. The officers found the cocaine, and Middleton was subsequently charged with bribery and drug possession.

Procedural History

Middleton moved to suppress his statements and the cocaine. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statements voluntary and the search justified by Middleton’s admission. Middleton pleaded guilty to possession and appealed the suppression ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Middleton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a defendant’s prior request for an attorney bars the admissibility of a spontaneous and unprovoked bribe offer to a police officer.
2. Whether police questioning regarding a bribe offer, after a defendant has requested counsel, violates the defendant’s right to counsel.
3. Whether a defendant’s admission of possessing contraband, made during questioning about a bribe offer, provides probable cause for a search and seizure of the contraband without a warrant.

Holding

1. No, because the bribe offer was spontaneous and constituted a new and separate crime.
2. No, because inquiries legitimately related to the bribe offer are outside the protection of the right to counsel rule.
3. Yes, because the defendant’s statement provided the officers with probable cause to search for and seize the cocaine.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel should not be used to shield a defendant from the consequences of committing a new crime (bribery) in the presence of police officers. Citing Vinyard v. United States, the court emphasized that employing counsel for a previous offense does not grant immunity from subsequent criminal acts. The court distinguished this case from those where police interrogation is the coercive influence. Here, Middleton initiated the conversation with the bribe offer. The court noted that “there is no constitutional right to be arrested” at the earliest moment of probable cause and that officers can continue investigating. The questions asked were within the realm of inquiry that a “rogue policeman considering whether to accept the bribe offer made” would ask. The court found that Middleton’s admission of cocaine possession provided probable cause for the search, negating any reasonable expectation of privacy. The court stated, “a defendant who asks for counsel in one breath and then with the next, without awaiting the arrival of counsel and without provocation, makes a bribe offer, has shown that he views his need for an attorney as limited to the legal proceedings that will ensue and considers himself quite competent to seek an illegal end to his predicament.” Therefore, the evidence was admissible, and the suppression motion was properly denied.