Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311 (1981)
Under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241, a prime contractor is liable for construction site injuries only when the injury arises from work specifically delegated to that contractor, giving them the authority to control the injury-producing activity.
Summary
George Russin, an employee of the general contractor, A.J. Cerasaro, Inc., was injured while dismantling a scaffold. He sued prime contractors (Mateo, Picciano, Stellmack) alleging Labor Law violations. The Court of Appeals held that these prime contractors, who had separate contracts with the Village of Endicott (the owner) and no contractual relationship with Cerasaro, were not liable. The Court reasoned that liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 requires the authority to control the activity causing the injury. Since the prime contractors lacked this control over the general construction work, they could not be held liable for Russin’s injuries.
Facts
The Village of Endicott contracted with seven individual contractors for the construction of a new clubhouse. A.J. Cerasaro, Inc. was the general contractor responsible for coordinating all work. Russin, a Cerasaro employee, was injured when a ladder he used to descend from a scaffold (being dismantled by Cerasaro) slipped. The ladder was owned by Picciano, a prime contractor for plumbing. The lawsuit was filed against Mateo (electrical), Picciano (plumbing), and Stellmack (HVAC).
Procedural History
Russin sued Mateo, Picciano, and Stellmack, alleging violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that as prime contractors, they had no contractual arrangement with the general contractor and therefore could not be liable. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether prime contractors, not in privity with the general contractor, can be held liable under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 for injuries sustained by a worker employed by the general contractor during work for which the general contractor was solely responsible.
Holding
No, because liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 requires the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury. Since the prime contractors’ contracts were directly with the owner, not with the general contractor, they lacked the requisite control over the general construction work that led to the plaintiff’s injury.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Section 200 of the Labor Law codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace, but this duty presupposes the authority to control the injury-producing activity. Because the prime contractors’ contracts were with the Village of Endicott, not with Cerasaro, they lacked the authority to control Russin’s work or the dismantling of the scaffolding. The court stated that the 1969 amendments to sections 240 and 241 were intended to shift responsibility for construction site injuries to those parties with control. The court emphasized that while the duties imposed by sections 240 and 241 are nondelegable, the *work* giving rise to those duties *can* be delegated. When work is delegated, the third party obtains the authority to supervise and control it, becoming a statutory “agent” of the owner or general contractor, and thus subject to liability. The court noted: “Under the present Sections 240 and 241 of the Labor Law, the non-delegable duty has shifted from the general contractor and owner to the subcontractor, making him responsible for many things that he has no control of, such as coordination and overall supervision of the work.” The court concluded that the prime contractors were only agents of the owner for their specific contracted work (plumbing, electrical, HVAC) and not for the general construction work. The court stated that imposing a nondelegable duty upon each contractor for all injuries occurring on a job site would be unjust and contravene legislative history. The court limited the liability of a contractor as agent to the scope of the delegated work, or the particular agency created.