Matter of Quinn, 54 N.Y.2d 370 (1981)
When a judge’s misconduct is linked to alcoholism and the judge has already resigned due to ill health, censure and acceptance of resignation may be a more appropriate sanction than removal, balancing the need for public confidence in the judiciary with considerations of disability.
Summary
This case concerns a New York Supreme Court Justice, Quinn, facing removal for multiple instances of driving under the influence of alcohol and related misconduct. Prior to the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation for removal, Quinn resigned due to alcoholism and cancer. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether removal was appropriate given Quinn’s health and resignation, ultimately deciding that censure and acceptance of his resignation better served the public interest. The court emphasized its broad power to determine appropriate sanctions for judicial misconduct.
Facts
Justice Quinn was elected as a Justice of the Supreme Court in 1974. In 1975, he had three encounters with the police involving alcohol, including being found asleep behind the wheel. He pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. In 1977, he was formally admonished for his drinking habits by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. In 1979, he was again arrested for driving under the influence; he was abusive to the arresting officer and invoked his judicial office. His blood alcohol content was .18%. He pleaded guilty to driving with greater than .10% alcohol in his blood. He joined an alcoholic rehabilitation program, but initially resisted fingerprinting.
Procedural History
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint charging Quinn with judicial misconduct. A referee recommended sustaining the charges and dismissing Quinn’s defenses, including alcoholism. Quinn submitted his resignation and applied for retirement due to ill health (cancer) before the commission determined he should be removed. The Commission ordered Quinn’s removal. Quinn requested review by the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office is appropriate for a judge, suffering from alcoholism and cancer, who has engaged in repeated instances of driving under the influence and who had submitted his resignation prior to the commission’s recommended determination of removal?
Holding
No, because under the specific circumstances, including the judge’s resignation due to failing health, censure and acceptance of the resignation better served the public interest than outright removal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged its broad constitutional power to determine the facts and appropriate sanction in matters involving judicial conduct. It found no basis to set aside the Commission’s factual findings regarding Quinn’s misconduct. The court stated, “Here the petitioner’s public drinking and notorious involvements with the law over a span of several years, can only have resulted in irretrievable loss of public confidence in his ability to properly carry out his judicial responsibilities.” The court recognized alcoholism as an illness and a type of disability, citing both federal and state laws. It distinguished between removal for cause (misconduct) and mandatory retirement (mental or physical disability). Though the complaint only charged misconduct, the court reasoned it could achieve a similar effect to mandatory retirement by censuring Quinn and acknowledging his resignation. The court also noted that Quinn’s resignation, tendered due to his inability to perform his duties because of ill health, offered a satisfactory solution. Giving effect to the resignation did not undermine the policy against judges resigning to avoid removal because of the particular circumstances of this case. The court ultimately imposed the lesser sanction of censure and acknowledged Quinn’s resignation, allowing him to retire.