Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Company, 54 N.Y.2d 167 (1981)
A utility company can be held liable for damages resulting from service interruption if its actions or inactions constitute gross negligence, even without explicit expert testimony defining the standard of care when the jury is competent to evaluate the utility’s conduct based on the facts presented.
Summary
This case concerns a grocery store chain’s lawsuit against Consolidated Edison (Con Edison) for damages resulting from the 1977 New York City blackout. The plaintiff alleged that Con Edison was grossly negligent in several respects, including failing to maintain adequate power sources, improperly managing the crisis, and staffing critical positions with inexperienced personnel. The New York Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to determine that Con Edison was grossly negligent, even without expert testimony, as the jury could evaluate Con Edison’s actions based on the presented facts. The court also clarified that the trial court properly presented the shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability.
Facts
On July 13, 1977, a blackout affected approximately three million Con Edison customers. The initiating event was two lightning strikes that caused double circuit outages of transmission lines. Plaintiff alleged that several power sources were unjustifiably out of service. These included the Hudson-Farragut tie, the Indian Point 2 power plant, and certain gas turbines. Plaintiff further alleged improper maintenance of relays and circuit breakers and inadequate lightning protection. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that William Jurith, the person in charge of the Con Edison system on the night of the blackout, reacted improperly to the crisis and lacked adequate experience. Con Edison argued that the power sources were justifiably out of service for repairs or due to the expiration of peak demand hours. They also maintained that their inspection program was adequate and Jurith acted appropriately.
Procedural History
The trial court instructed the jury that they could only return a verdict for the plaintiff if they found that the defendant had been grossly negligent. The jury found that Con Edison had been grossly negligent and awarded the plaintiff $40,500. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Con Edison appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of Con Edison’s gross negligence to present the issue for jury determination.
2. Whether expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care Con Edison allegedly violated.
3. Whether the use of a general verdict was improper given the multiple alleged shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures.
Holding
1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence of Con Edison’s gross negligence for the jury to consider, particularly regarding the actions and inactions of its system operator, William Jurith.
2. No, because the jury was competent to evaluate Con Edison’s actions based on the factual presentation alone, especially concerning the system operator’s response to the emergency.
3. No, because the trial court presented the alleged shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine gross negligence without expert testimony. The court reasoned that while some issues require expert testimony due to scientific or technical complexity, this case did not. The jury was capable of evaluating Con Edison’s actions, particularly the behavior of the system operator, William Jurith, during the crisis. The court noted Jurith’s failure to comply with the New York Power Pool’s directions to reduce voltage by shedding load after the lightning strikes. The court stated, “The actions of Con Edison’s employees on the night of the blackout, and Con Edison’s staffing decisions, could properly be judged by the members of the jury unaided by expert testimony to clarify the standard of care.” The court distinguished this case from situations requiring expert testimony, such as medical malpractice, where the lack of skill or success is not obvious. Regarding the general verdict, the court emphasized that the alleged shortcomings were presented as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability, thus making the general verdict appropriate. The court cited Davis v. Caldwell, distinguishing it by noting that in this case, the jury was presented with a summary of evidentiary contentions, not separate theories of liability for individual determination.