Sinhogar v. Parry, 53 N.Y.2d 426 (1981)

The procedures available to children and their parents for judicial review of out-of-state placements of emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children satisfy both federal and state constitutional due process requirements.

Summary

This case addresses whether the procedures for placing emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children in out-of-state foster care meet constitutional due process requirements. Several children, through guardians, sued New York City and State officials, arguing that out-of-state placements violated their rights. The Court of Appeals held that existing review procedures, including administrative review and Article 78 proceedings, are constitutionally sufficient. The court emphasized that the case did not concern the initial removal of children from their natural families, but rather subsequent transfers from in-state to out-of-state foster care. The court declined to make sweeping pronouncements on the substantive rights of the children, reserving those issues for trial.

Facts

Carlos Sinhogar and Jeannette Morgan, emotionally disturbed teenagers in the custody of the New York City Department of Social Services, were placed in institutions in Virginia and Florida, respectively. John Evans, a retarded teenager living with his parents, was offered out-of-state placement due to the unavailability of in-state options that his parents could afford. The plaintiffs argued that these out-of-state placements infringed on their constitutional rights, particularly the right to an ongoing family relationship and the right to state-created benefits such as adequate care.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment, directing the defendants to propose a review procedure for challenging out-of-state placements. The Appellate Division modified this decision, declaring out-of-state placements pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) constitutional and dismissing the complaint against one defendant in his individual capacity. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the procedures available to children and their parents for review of out-of-state placements of emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children meet constitutional due process requirements.
2. Whether parents are constitutionally entitled to prior notice of every prospective out-of-state placement.

Holding

1. Yes, because the available review procedures, including administrative review and Article 78 proceedings, provide sufficient due process.
2. No, because neither Congress nor the Department of Health and Human Services has regarded prior notice or formal review procedures as fundamental due process rights.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals measured the available review procedures against the constitutional standards prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Referencing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the court noted that the Supreme Court had previously determined New York’s statutory system for regulating foster care placements to be constitutionally sufficient. The court emphasized that the placements in question were not the initial removals from the natural family setting, but subsequent transfers. Regarding prior notice, the court found no categorical constitutional right to such notice for out-of-state placements. The court highlighted that administrative review is available to “[a]ny person aggrieved by such decision” (Social Services Law, § 400, subd. 2), and that fair hearing determinations can be judicially scrutinized in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. While acknowledging that more streamlined review procedures might be desirable, the court concluded that the existing procedures meet minimum constitutional mandates. The court stated, “The issue is whether the Constitutions mandate the provision of review procedures which are not now available and which would be beyond impairment or diminution by either administrative or legislative action. We conclude…that they do not.”