53 N.Y.2d 178 (1981)
To sustain a conviction for criminal contempt based on evasive answers before a grand jury, the prosecution does not need to prove that the underlying event or conversation referenced in the questions actually occurred.
Summary
Defendant, an attorney, was convicted of criminal contempt for giving evasive answers to a grand jury investigating misconduct. Specifically, he repeatedly claimed he didn’t recall a conversation with another attorney, Abe Brown, about a potential bribe. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution wasn’t required to prove the alleged conversation with Brown actually occurred. The critical issue was whether the defendant intentionally evaded answering the questions, not whether the underlying facts were true. The court reasoned that evasive contempt hinges on the intent to avoid answering, regardless of the truth of the matter being investigated.
Facts
The defendant, a practicing attorney, appeared before a grand jury investigating possible misconduct by Abram Brown, a law assistant. The defendant was asked if Brown had told him that another law assistant, identified as Brown’s cousin, expected a payment from the defendant in return for a favorable decision for the defendant’s client. The defendant repeatedly responded that he did not recall the conversation or statement.
Procedural History
The defendant was charged with six counts of criminal contempt. His first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, he was acquitted of two counts, but the jury deadlocked on the remaining four. At the third trial, one count was dismissed, he was acquitted on two counts, and the jury found him guilty on one count. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution must prove that the event, conversation, or other fact referred to in the grand jury questions actually occurred to sustain a conviction for criminal contempt based on evasive answers.
Holding
No, because the essence of criminal contempt based on evasive testimony is whether the defendant intended to avoid answering the question, not whether the underlying facts are true or false.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished between the “happening” of an event and the “telling” about it. The questions focused on whether Abe Brown made a statement to the defendant, not on the underlying transaction itself. Therefore, the prosecution did not need to prove the underlying event occurred. The court stated that conviction for “evasive contempt” must be based on a determination that there was a refusal to answer a material question before the Grand Jury. The essence of the conviction is that the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s response was intended as no answer at all and was thus tantamount to a refusal to answer. The court emphasized, “It is not the content of the answer on which a conviction for contempt can be based; it is that in the circumstances in which the question is asked and the response given, whatever may be the normal denotation of the words spoken, the jury is warranted in concluding, as it did in this case, that the words were spoken with intent to evade making an answer.” The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury that the prosecution had to prove the underlying event occurred. The court stated that such a charge would have improperly led the jury into consideration of a collateral and extraneous issue of fact, and might inadvertently have led them to an unwarranted verdict on the contempt charge based on their evaluation of the truth or falsity of defendant’s answers.