People v. Tom, 59 N.Y.2d 45 (1983): Waiver of Counsel at Lineup and Judicial Overreach

People v. Tom, 59 N.Y.2d 45 (1983)

A defendant’s right to counsel at a post-arraignment lineup can be waived by counsel, even outside the defendant’s presence, provided the waiver is informed and strategic; however, a trial judge’s excessive interference in the examination of witnesses can deprive a defendant of a fair trial.

Summary

Yut Wai Tom was convicted of second-degree murder. Key evidence included lineup identifications. Tom’s attorney initially arranged the lineup but left before it occurred, telling the prosecutor to proceed without him. The New York Court of Appeals held that the attorney’s waiver of presence was valid, but reversed the conviction because the trial judge’s excessive questioning of witnesses unfairly prejudiced the defense. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s rights while ensuring judicial impartiality.

Facts

Fong Yue Yee was shot and killed in Manhattan’s Chinatown. Michael Chin saw Tom in a beige Nova near the scene shortly before the shooting. Rosabel and Marivel Ortiz witnessed the shooting; they later identified Tom from a photo album and at a lineup. Tom was arrested and arraigned. His attorney, Joseph Stone, initially arranged the lineup but left due to a scheduling conflict, instructing the prosecutor to proceed without him because he was satisfied the lineup would be fair.

Procedural History

Tom was convicted of second-degree murder. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications, arguing denial of right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a defendant’s right to counsel at a post-arraignment lineup is effectively waived when the defendant’s attorney, having discussed the lineup with the defendant, arranges the lineup details, and then instructs the prosecutor to proceed in his absence.

2. Whether the trial judge’s persistent and excessive participation in the examination of witnesses denied the defendant a fair trial.

Holding

1. Yes, because the attorney had fully consulted with the defendant, arranged for a fair lineup, and strategically chose to absent himself, communicating the waiver to the prosecutor.

2. Yes, because the trial judge abandoned his role as an impartial arbiter and assumed the role of an advocate, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s case.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while a defendant needs counsel in custody to protect against coercion and inappropriate communication, the rule prohibiting waiver of counsel outside counsel’s presence does not apply when counsel, after full consultation with the client, strategically waives their presence. The court emphasized that Stone, Tom’s attorney, had arranged a fair lineup and advised his client. Further, Stone had a strategic reason for leaving, stemming from concerns about witness intimidation. “[O]ur goal is to protect the substantive rights of individual defendants, not ritualistically to impose requirements which add nothing to the protections afforded a defendant.”

However, the Court found the trial judge’s conduct to be egregious. The judge asked over 1,300 questions, essentially conducting direct examination of key prosecution witnesses and repeatedly interrupting defense counsel’s cross-examination to rehabilitate witnesses. The court noted that, “[t]he role of the Trial Judge is neither that of automaton nor advocate,” but rather to safeguard the rights of the accused and the interests of the public. The court emphasized that a judge should intervene sparingly and should avoid trying the case for the lawyers, which unfortunately did not occur in this case.