People v. Ditta, 52 N.Y.2d 657 (1981)
The crime of first-degree sexual abuse, as defined in New York Penal Law § 130.65, occurs when a person compels another to touch the actor’s sexual or other intimate parts, as this constitutes “sexual contact”.
Summary
This case addresses whether a defendant can be convicted of first-degree sexual abuse when they force another person to touch their sexual or intimate parts. The New York Court of Appeals held that such conduct does indeed constitute sexual abuse under Penal Law § 130.65. The Court reasoned that the statute’s language is broad enough to encompass situations where the defendant compels the victim to touch them, as this still involves the defendant “subjecting” another person to sexual contact. The Court rejected a narrow interpretation focusing solely on who initiates the physical touch.
Facts
The 16-year-old victim was walking to school when John Ditta, the defendant, accosted her on a motorcycle. Ditta flashed a badge, which the victim believed to be a police shield. He then blocked her path with the motorcycle and his body. Seeing a knife in Ditta’s pocket, the victim, fearing for her life, complied with his demands. Ditta placed his jacket on the ground, got down, and ordered the victim to get on top of him. He displayed the knife and threatened to kill her if she did not comply. Ditta instructed the victim to touch his crotch area, which she did for a few minutes. She stated the area felt hard, and Ditta’s pants were wet. The victim then lost consciousness. Police, alerted by a witness, apprehended Ditta nearby. He possessed a knife and a Department of Sanitation shield. An officer noticed a wet spot on Ditta’s pants in the crotch area.
Procedural History
Ditta was convicted after a non-jury trial of first-degree sexual abuse, second-degree unlawful imprisonment, fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon, endangering the welfare of a minor, and menacing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without issuing an opinion. Ditta then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the act of compelling another person to touch the defendant’s sexual or intimate parts constitutes “sexual contact” within the meaning of New York Penal Law § 130.65, thereby supporting a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse.
Holding
Yes, because the statute prohibits a person from “subjecting another to sexual contact,” and this language is broad enough to include instances where the defendant compels the victim to touch them.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals rejected a strict construction of the penal code, emphasizing that the Penal Law should be interpreted “according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law” (Penal Law, § 5.00). The court noted that § 130.65 does not specify who must perform the touching, stating: “Nowhere does the section prescribe which person must perform the actual touching. On its face, it is broad enough to encompass sexual touching of the victim by the defendant or touching of the defendant by the victim under compulsion by the defendant. In either instance, the defendant would be subjecting another person to sexual contact.”
The Court found that the definition of “sexual contact” in § 130.00(3) as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor” was not intended to limit the scope of § 130.65. The Court reasoned that the definitional section primarily aimed to exclude sexual contact between married persons from the statute’s reach. To interpret “actor” as referring exclusively to the defendant would lead to an absurd result, making the applicability of the law contingent on which party is the more active participant. The Court emphasized the inclusive nature of section 130.65 and that the legislative intent was not to limit the crime only to instances where the defendant performs the actual touching. The court explicitly stated the defendant is made criminally liable, not if he touches another, but if he “subjects another person to sexual contact.”