People v. Wolfson, 61 N.Y.2d 870 (1984)

An informal promise of non-prosecution, absent constitutional or statutory authorization, does not confer immunity from prosecution, although it might, in some circumstances, lead to the suppression of resulting statements as involuntary.

Summary

Defendants Wolfson and Dunbar appealed their convictions for criminal sale of marihuana. They argued that a prior informal promise of non-prosecution made during an internal investigation should bar their prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that such an informal promise does not confer immunity from prosecution, as immunity requires constitutional or statutory basis. The Court also rejected the claim that the Grand Jury proceeding was defective due to a technical violation regarding the Special Assistant District Attorney’s residency waiver. The Court reasoned that the failure to obtain the waiver did not negate the authority of the prosecutor. Finally, the court stated that the defendants’ guilty pleas waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury.

Facts

Defendants Wolfson and Dunbar were convicted of criminal sale of marihuana in the fourth degree, based on guilty pleas. These pleas were entered after indictments against them. The defendants argued that the prosecution was barred because they had been given an informal promise that the “book would be closed” following an internal investigation of marihuana use by members of the Nassau County District Attorney’s staff.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted in the trial court based on their guilty pleas. They appealed, arguing that the prosecution was barred by a prior promise of non-prosecution and that the Grand Jury proceeding was defective. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an informal promise of non-prosecution made during an internal investigation bars a subsequent criminal prosecution.
2. Whether the failure to obtain a waiver of nonresidence for a Special Assistant District Attorney, as required by the Nassau County Administrative Code, renders a Grand Jury proceeding defective.
3. Whether a guilty plea waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

Holding

1. No, because immunity from prosecution requires a constitutional or statutory basis, and an informal promise does not meet this requirement.
2. No, because the failure to obtain a residency waiver does not affect the authority or power of an appointed Special Assistant District Attorney to serve.
3. Yes, because a guilty plea generally waives any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that immunity from prosecution can only be conferred either by the Constitution or as authorized by statute. The informal promise of non-prosecution, if it existed, could not confer immunity because it lacked such a basis. The court acknowledged that such a promise might, in some circumstances, entitle a defendant to the suppression of statements made as involuntary, according to CPL 60.45 (subd 2, par [b], cl [i]), but this was not dispositive here. Regarding the Grand Jury proceeding, the court distinguished the case from People v. Di Falco, where a lack of jurisdiction impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury. Here, the Special Assistant District Attorney had been appointed by the District Attorney and had taken the oath of office, meaning that, regardless of the unobtained residency waiver, the prosecutor had the actual authority to serve in the role and present the case to the Grand Jury. Finally, the court relied on the established precedent of People v. Kazmarick, stating that the defendants’ claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury, which were waived by their guilty pleas.