52 N.Y.2d 454 (1981)
In New York, evidence of a defendant’s pretrial silence has minimal probative value and a high potential for prejudice, making it inadmissible for impeachment purposes absent unusual circumstances.
Summary
Thomas Conyers’ conviction for armed robbery was initially reversed by the Appellate Division due to the prosecutor’s use of Conyers’ post-arrest silence to impeach his trial testimony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case after Jenkins v. Anderson. On reconsideration, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its original ruling, holding that New York evidentiary rules preclude using a defendant’s pretrial silence for impeachment due to its limited probative value and high risk of prejudice, regardless of federal constitutional standards.
Facts
Conyers was accused of robbing Marion Dantzler and Grace Johnson. At trial, Conyers testified that he was collecting a gambling debt from Dantzler when Dantzler drew a gun. Conyers claimed he disarmed Dantzler, took the gun and gambling proceeds, and fled. He stated Dantzler then pursued him until police arrested him. The prosecution questioned Conyers about his failure to tell this story to the arresting officer immediately after his arrest, suggesting recent fabrication.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Conyers. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the reversal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the New York Court of Appeals’ order, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Jenkins v. Anderson. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its original decision.
Issue(s)
Whether evidence of a defendant’s pretrial silence is admissible to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony under New York evidentiary rules.
Holding
No, because evidence of a defendant’s pretrial silence has minimal probative value and a substantial risk of prejudice, outweighing its usefulness for impeachment purposes under New York evidentiary rules.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that an individual’s silence may be due to several factors unrelated to guilt, such as awareness of the right to remain silent, fear of self-incrimination, mistrust of law enforcement, or a belief that exoneration efforts would be futile. The court stated, “Although a defendant’s failure to come forward with an exculpatory version of events prior to trial may reflect negatively upon the veracity of his trial testimony, his prior silence also may be attributable to a variety of innocent circumstances that are completely unrelated to the truth or falsity of his testimony.” Jurors may misinterpret silence as an admission of guilt. The court found the potential for prejudice outweighs its probative value. The court cited People v. Molineux and People v. Sandoval, noting its power to formulate evidentiary rules to protect the integrity of the truth-finding process. Evidence that is highly prejudicial but of low probative worth has traditionally been excluded from criminal trials. The court distinguished People v. Dawson, noting the risk of direct prejudice to the defendant versus indirect prejudice to a non-party witness. The court concluded, “When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.”