People v. Ferro, 54 N.Y.2d 64 (1981)
Once a suspect in custody requests an attorney, any statements made by the suspect are inadmissible unless they are truly spontaneous and not the product of an interrogation environment, inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence.
Summary
Ferro voluntarily went to the police station, was given Miranda warnings, and requested an attorney. Despite this request, he was transported to another location, and while in custody, made statements that the trial court admitted, finding them to be voluntary and not in response to questioning. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements should have been suppressed. The Court emphasized that statements made after a request for counsel are only admissible if truly spontaneous, meaning not the product of an interrogation environment or any form of inducement, regardless of how subtle.
Facts
The defendant, Ferro, voluntarily went to the police station at the request of the police.
He was given his Miranda warnings.
Ferro and his uncle, who accompanied him, requested an attorney.
No attorney was provided, but Ferro was allowed to make a phone call to try and contact one.
Ferro and his uncle were then transported to a different police substation.
Upon arrival, the uncle again demanded that Ferro be given an attorney and was assured that one would be provided.
Ferro was separated from his uncle and kept in an inspector’s office for several hours.
The inspector advised Ferro of his Miranda rights again and informed him that he was under arrest.
Ferro stated that he did not want to talk without talking to an attorney.
He was told that he would be given an attorney at his arraignment.
Ferro then made oral statements that the prosecution sought to admit.
Procedural History
The trial court held a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of Ferro’s statements.
The suppression court found that Ferro’s statements were “voluntary and not in response to questions put to him by the investigators.”
The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s finding.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a new trial.
Issue(s)
1. Whether statements made by a suspect in custody after requesting an attorney are admissible if they are deemed “voluntary and not in response to questions” but are not shown to be truly spontaneous and free from any interrogation environment.
2. Whether a warrantless search of a defendant’s car is valid when there is no evidence to support a finding of consent to the search.
Holding
1. Yes, because to be admissible after a request for counsel, the statements must be shown to be truly spontaneous and not the product of an interrogation environment or any form of inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence. The finding that the statements were voluntary and not in response to express questioning is insufficient.
2. No, because without evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant consented to the search, the items seized should have been suppressed.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that simply finding statements to be “voluntary and not in response to questions” is not enough to admit them when they are made after a suspect has requested an attorney. The Court stated, “To entitle these statements to receipt in evidence it must at least be shown that they were in no way the product of an ‘interrogation environment’, the result of ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent’ (cf. Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-301).”
The court found that the record did not support a finding that Ferro’s statements were spontaneous. The court reasoned that spontaneity requires that statements are “self-generating” and made “without apparent external cause.” It emphasized that even subtle forms of inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence can negate spontaneity. The court directly cited People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303 for the proposition that admissible statements must not be “the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.”
Regarding the search of the car, the court found that there was no evidence to support a finding that the defendant consented to the search. Without evidence that the defendant gave the police the keys or otherwise consented, the search was unlawful, and the items seized should have been suppressed.