New York Law Review

Elkan v. Arredondo, 41 N.Y.2d 693 (1977): Establishing Defect in Products Liability Claims

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Elkan v. Arredondo, 41 N.Y.2d 693 (1977)

In a products liability case, a manufacturer is not entitled to summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to Volkswagenwerk, AG (VWAG). The Elkans sued Arredondo (driver of the other vehicle), Luby Volkswagen (from whom they purchased the car), and Volkswagen of America, Inc., alleging a defective seat belt system caused Mrs. Elkan’s injuries in a car accident. Luby then impleaded VWAG, the manufacturer. VWAG moved for summary judgment, arguing the car had multiple prior owners, and Luby installed “the seat belt system.” The Court of Appeals found a factual dispute existed as to whether VWAG installed defective anchors, precluding summary judgment.

Facts

The Elkans were involved in a car accident where their Volkswagen, manufactured by VWAG, was struck by Arredondo’s vehicle. The Elkans’ Volkswagen was a secondhand vehicle. After the impact, Mrs. Elkan’s seat belt came open, and she was ejected from the vehicle, sustaining severe injuries. The Elkans claimed that the seat belt system and door latch mechanism were defectively designed. The car had four prior owners before the Elkans purchased it from Luby. VWAG argued that Luby installed the “seat belt system.”

Procedural History

The Supreme Court, New York County, denied VWAG’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to VWAG. The Elkans appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the seat belt system was defective when the vehicle left VWAG’s control, precluding summary judgment.

Holding

Yes, because there was a factual dispute regarding whether Luby installed only the seat belts or the entire seat belt system, including the anchors, which could have been defective when they left VWAG’s control.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that VWAG failed to conclusively prove that Luby installed the entire seat belt *system*, including the anchors. Mr. Elkan’s testimony indicated that “seat belts” were installed, not necessarily the entire system, and the Luby work order simply stated “install seat belt.” The court stated that “The trier of fact may infer from this evidence either that the installation was of the belt but not the anchors or that it was of both.” This created a factual issue as to whether VWAG was responsible for installing defective anchors. The court emphasized that if VWAG had submitted expert testimony pinpointing the cause of the seat belt failure after examining the car, Luby would have been required to present countervailing evidence. However, based on the evidence presented, it was for the trier of fact to determine whether a defect existed when the vehicle left VWAG’s control. The court implied that the burden was on VWAG, as the moving party, to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of a factual issue. Because the evidence was ambiguous regarding the scope of Luby’s installation, VWAG failed to meet this burden. This case illustrates that in products liability cases, the plaintiff must ultimately prove the defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control, but the *defendant* bears the initial burden on a motion for summary judgment to show the absence of such a defect.

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