People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)
The “indelible” right to counsel, which prevents police questioning in the absence of an attorney, does not extend to unrelated charges when that right arises solely from the filing of an accusatory instrument on the unrelated charge, unless the police know about the pending unrelated charge.
Summary
Bartolomeo was convicted of murder. He argued that his confession should have been suppressed because he had an “indelible” right to counsel on an unrelated shoplifting charge due to an outstanding arrest warrant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the right to counsel on the shoplifting charge did not preclude questioning on the murder charge, as the police lacked actual knowledge of the outstanding warrant. The Court distinguished between actual representation by counsel and the mere existence of an outstanding charge, limiting the scope of the Rogers rule.
Facts
Bartolomeo was a suspect in a murder investigation. He voluntarily accompanied detectives to a police station and then to undergo a polygraph examination. Before the polygraph, the detective knew of an outstanding shoplifting charge against Bartolomeo. After the polygraph, Bartolomeo confessed to the murder. Bartolomeo argued that because an accusatory instrument and arrest warrant were outstanding on the shoplifting charge, his right to counsel had attached, and his confession to murder should be suppressed.
Procedural History
The trial court denied Bartolomeo’s motion to suppress his confession. He was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the “indelible” right to counsel, arising from the filing of an accusatory instrument and the issuance of an arrest warrant on an unrelated charge, precludes police questioning on a new charge when the police know of the pending unrelated charge.
Holding
No, because the “indelible” right to counsel does not extend to unrelated charges solely because of the existence of an outstanding accusatory instrument unless the police actually know about the pending unrelated charge.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished its prior holding in People v. Rogers, which held that once a defendant is represented by counsel, they cannot be questioned on any matter without counsel present. The Court noted that Rogers involved actual representation by an attorney, whereas Bartolomeo’s right to counsel on the shoplifting charge stemmed solely from the commencement of formal proceedings (the outstanding warrant). The Court emphasized that extending the Rogers rule to situations where the police were unaware of pending unrelated charges would place an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. The Court stated, “To extend the Rogers rule to the circumstances here presented would be to expand the derivative right to counsel beyond the reach of logic and sound policy. To hold that the warrant outstanding in a Town Court 50 miles away constructively interposes an attorney between the police and defendant, would unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.” The Court also pointed out that there was no active attorney-client relationship on the shoplifting charge to be protected. The dissent argued that the commencement of criminal proceedings should be equated with actual representation by counsel, and that the Rogers rule should apply to prevent police from circumventing the right to counsel by questioning defendants on unrelated charges. Chief Judge Cooke, in dissent, asserted that “the rationale of Rogers itself—that law enforcement officials should not be permitted to circumvent the right to counsel by the simple expedient of questioning on unrelated charges—requires this result.” The majority rejected this view, fearing it would “unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.”