Smith v. Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82 (1981)
There is no cause of action for negligent supervision between unemancipated minor siblings in New York; therefore, a third party cannot bring a claim for contribution against a sibling for negligent supervision.
Summary
This case addresses whether a younger sibling can sue an older sibling for negligent supervision, and whether a third party can seek contribution from the older sibling for such negligence. A four-year-old boy was allegedly attacked by a dog while his ten-year-old sister was supervising him. The court held that there is no cause of action for negligent supervision between unemancipated minor siblings. Consequently, a third party cannot seek contribution from the older sibling based on a claim of negligent supervision. The court reasoned that recognizing such a cause of action would disrupt family harmony, potentially dilute compensation for the injured child, and create an incongruous result given that minor siblings generally do not have a legal duty to supervise each other.
Facts
On May 4, 1977, Heather Smith, age 10, took her four-year-old brother, Christian, to deliver Girl Scout cookies to their neighbors, the Sapienzas. While on the Sapienzas’ property, Christian was allegedly attacked by their collie dog. William Smith, the children’s father, sued the Sapienzas on Christian’s behalf and for his own medical expenses. The Sapienzas then brought a third-party action against William and Heather, alleging negligent failure to supervise Christian.
Procedural History
The Special Term granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint against Heather. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal specifically on the issue of the dismissal of the complaint against Heather.
Issue(s)
Whether a cause of action exists between unemancipated minor siblings for negligent supervision, and, if not, whether a third party can maintain a claim for contribution against the allegedly negligent sibling.
Holding
No, because there is no historical precedent or sound policy reason for creating such a cause of action; and, no, because a claim for contribution requires a violation of duties owed to the injured person, and a sibling generally owes no duty of supervision to another sibling.
Court’s Reasoning
The court began by acknowledging the abrogation of intrafamilial immunity for non-willful torts in Gelbman v. Gelbman. However, the court emphasized that while Gelbman made family members liable for ordinary torts, it also opened the door to exploring duties arising specifically from family relationships. Despite this, the court found no precedent for a negligent supervision action between siblings and declined to create one. The court relied heavily on policy considerations similar to those in Holodook v. Spencer, which denied a similar action against a parent. Recognizing such an action would lead to Dole claims against the sibling, potentially reducing the injured child’s recovery. More importantly, it would create intrafamily conflict, as parents would be forced to take adversarial positions. The court also noted that while parents have a legal duty to supervise their children, siblings generally do not, making such an action incongruous. Finally, the court reasoned that temporary entrustment of a child’s well-being to a sibling is often a parental delegation, and allowing suit against the sibling would indirectly allow suit against the parent. As to the third-party claim, the court stated, “A claim for contribution exists only when two or more tort-feasors share in responsibility for an injury, in violation of duties they respectively owed to the injured person.”