People v. Thomas, 51 N.Y.2d 466 (1980)
A trial court has discretion to prevent a witness from invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury and may be required to give a neutral instruction explaining a witness’s absence if the jury is aware the witness might have information helpful to the defendant.
Summary
Thomas was convicted of robbery, weapon possession, and stolen property possession. At trial, two potential defense witnesses, Whitlock and Cook, indicated they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court refused to allow them to invoke the privilege in front of the jury and denied a request to instruct the jury about Whitlock’s absence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had discretion to prevent the witnesses from invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury, but also stated that a neutral instruction explaining a witness’s absence may be required if the jury is aware the witness might have information helpful to the defense. The Court reasoned that allowing the jury to hear the invocation of the Fifth Amendment could lead to unwarranted speculation.
Facts
Joseph Lataillade, a service station attendant, was robbed at gunpoint by a driver in a stolen car. Lataillade handed over 45-50 single dollar bills.
Police officers spotted a matching vehicle at another service station and apprehended Thomas after a chase. Thomas had 49 single dollar bills on his person.
Thomas claimed he borrowed the car from Alan Whitlock and that Whitlock committed the robbery.
Whitlock and David Cook, potential defense witnesses, indicated they would invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Thomas on all three counts.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the defendant has an absolute right to call a witness to the stand solely to have them invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for an instruction advising the jury that a witness had elected to invoke his constitutional privilege.
Holding
1. No, because a witness’s refusal to testify on constitutional grounds does not, in and of itself, have any real probative significance, although it may have a disproportionate impact upon the minds of the jurors and may tend to create the impression that the witness is guilty of a particular crime.
2. No, because the invitation to the jury to engage in unwarranted speculation exists whether the jury is informed of a witness’ refusal to testify by the Trial Judge or by the witness himself.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that a trial court has discretion to prevent a witness from invoking the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury. The Court reasoned that the witness’s silence has no probative value and could lead to unwarranted speculation by the jury. The Court stated, “The rule is founded on the sound premise that a witness’ refusal to testify on constitutional grounds does not, in and of itself, have any real probative significance, although it may have a disproportionate impact upon the minds of the jurors and may tend to create the impression that the witness is guilty of a particular crime”.
However, the Court also noted that in some cases, a neutral instruction explaining a witness’s absence may be necessary to prevent the jury from drawing an improper inference against the defendant. The Court suggested the following instruction: “There has been testimony in this case about [a witness] named [John Doe]. As a result of a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the court has determined that [Mr. Doe] is not available to be called as a witness by either side in this case. The jury may not draw any inference from the fact that [Mr. Doe] did not appear as a witness”.
The Court found that the defendant was not entitled to such an instruction in this case because he did not request a neutral instruction, but instead argued that he had an absolute right to have the jury informed of the witness’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment.