People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)
Once the police are aware that a suspect has retained counsel in connection with the charges under investigation, they cannot question the suspect in the absence of counsel, regardless of the specific terms of the attorney-client relationship known to the police.
Summary
The defendant, believing he was a suspect in a homicide, retained an attorney who arranged his surrender to the police. The police, aware of the attorney’s involvement, took the defendant into custody and obtained incriminating statements after a Miranda waiver, but without the attorney present. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statements should have been suppressed because the police knew the defendant had retained counsel, and the exact scope of the attorney’s representation was irrelevant to the police conduct, since they had no specific knowledge of its limitations. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, preventing police from exploiting ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship.
Facts
The defendant believed he was wanted by police for a homicide investigation and consulted an attorney.
The attorney contacted the police, confirmed they were looking for the defendant, and arranged for his surrender.
The police took the defendant into custody at the attorney’s office.
At the police station, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, waived them, and made incriminating statements without counsel present.
The attorney had only agreed to arrange the surrender, but the police were unaware of this limitation.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements.
The defendant was convicted at trial.
The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the police could question the defendant in the absence of counsel when they knew the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of arrest, but did not know that the attorney had only agreed to arrange the defendant’s surrender to the police.
Holding
Yes, because the police were aware that the defendant had retained counsel, and the scope of the attorney’s representation, as known to the police, did not negate the defendant’s right to have counsel present during questioning.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Hobson, which protects a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding. The Court stated that it has “attached little significance to the contractual arrangements between the defendant and his attorney in determining whether the defendant’s right to counsel has been violated during custodial interrogation.” It emphasized that the key factor is the police’s awareness of an attorney’s appearance on the defendant’s behalf.
The Court noted that the police were aware that the defendant had sought and retained counsel, and that the attorney had arranged the surrender. While the attorney’s representation may have technically terminated prior to questioning, the police were not aware of that limited arrangement. The Court reasoned that consulting a lawyer and surrendering with counsel present manifests the defendant’s view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, quoting Michigan v. Mosley: ” ‘his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice’ (Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 110, 2 [White, J., concurring]).”
The Court extended the protection of Hobson to situations where the police are generally aware of representation, even if the exact scope of that representation is unclear, emphasizing that the police should not exploit ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship to justify questioning without counsel present.