Crescent Electric Installation Corp. v. Board of Education, 50 N.Y.2d 783 (1980)
Claims against the Board of Education of the City of New York must satisfy the requirements of both section 2562 and subdivision 1 of section 3813 of the Education Law.
Summary
This case addresses whether a construction contractor’s claim against the New York City Board of Education must comply with both Education Law § 2562 and § 3813(1). Crescent Electrical Installation Corp. sued the Board for breach of contract related to construction delays. The Board argued Crescent failed to file a timely notice of claim under § 3813(1). The Court of Appeals held that both sections apply, requiring Crescent to comply with both the procedural requirements of § 2562 and the notice of claim timeline in § 3813(1). This ruling clarifies that the statutes are complementary, not mutually exclusive, ensuring the Board receives adequate and timely notice of claims while preserving its right to examine claimants.
Facts
Crescent Electrical Installation Corp. contracted with the Board of Education of the City of New York for electrical work on a new school. The work was substantially completed in September 1972. The Board approved the “Final Certificate” in November 1972 and authorized final payment shortly after December 12, 1972. Later, the Board issued change orders increasing the contract price. On June 13, 1973, Crescent filed a notice of claim seeking the contract balance, extras, and damages for delay, alleging breach of contract by the Board.
Procedural History
The initial trial ended in a mistrial. Before the second trial, the Board moved to amend its answer to assert an affirmative defense, arguing Crescent failed to serve a timely notice of claim as required by Education Law § 3813(1). The Board also moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding § 3813(1) applied and Crescent’s notice was untimely, granting the Board’s motion.
Issue(s)
Whether claims against the Board of Education of the City of New York are governed exclusively by Education Law § 2562, or whether they must also comply with the requirements of Education Law § 3813(1), specifically the time limit for filing a notice of claim.
Holding
No, claims against the Board of Education of the City of New York must comply with both Education Law § 2562 and § 3813(1) because the provisions are complementary and not mutually exclusive.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Education Law § 2562 and § 3813(1) are complementary statutes. Section 2562, specific to New York City, grants the Board the right to examine claimants and requires a 30-day waiting period before an action can be brought. Section 3813(1) applies statewide and includes a three-month limitation period for presenting claims. The non-superseder clause in § 3813(1) ensures that § 2562’s provisions remain in effect for claims against the New York City Board of Education. The Court emphasized that the statutes are not inconsistent; § 2562 provides for pre-litigation examinations, while § 3813(1) imposes a time limit for notice of claim. The Court noted that the nonsuperseder provision preserves the concurrent application of both sections, with § 2562 taking precedence only if the two sections directly conflict. Thus, claimants must satisfy both statutes to maintain an action against the New York City Board of Education. The court stated, “The provisions of sections 3813 and 2562 are complementary, not inconsistent or incongruous…The nonsuperseder provision serves to preserve the concurrent application of both sections…and to prescribe the transcendence of section 2562 if in any particular factual situation the provisions of the two sections collide.”