In the Matter of the Honorable Jerome L. Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d 74 (1980)

A judge’s personal business activities must not create an appearance of impropriety or undermine the integrity of the judicial office, and conduct both on and off the bench should adhere to ethical standards expected of judicial officers.

Summary

Judge Jerome L. Steinberg was removed from his position as a New York City Civil Court Judge following an investigation by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The investigation revealed that Steinberg had engaged in a series of private business dealings, including arranging loans for friends at high interest rates and collecting payments, sometimes using his judicial chambers and staff. He also misrepresented income and deductions on his federal income tax returns and concealed his identity in one loan transaction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding that Steinberg’s conduct violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics and demonstrated a disregard for the ethical obligations of a judge, warranting removal from office.

Facts

Judge Steinberg took office in 1970. Shortly after, he assisted friends in securing loans, acting as a broker for high-interest loans, sometimes exceeding legally permissible rates. He personally collected loan payments, occasionally using his chambers or a judicial employee. In one instance, he concealed his identity from a borrower, signing receipts with his law assistant’s name. Steinberg also failed to accurately report income from these activities on his tax returns and falsely claimed medical expense deductions for loan payments.

Procedural History

The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Steinberg’s conduct and determined that his actions cast serious doubt on his fitness to serve as a judge, recommending his removal from the bench. Steinberg sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Judge Steinberg’s involvement in private business activities, including arranging high-interest loans and collecting payments, violated the ethical standards governing judicial conduct.
2. Whether Judge Steinberg’s misrepresentation of income and deductions on his federal income tax returns and concealment of his identity in a loan transaction constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
3. Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office was appropriate given the totality of Judge Steinberg’s conduct.

Holding

1. Yes, because Judge Steinberg’s conduct created the appearance that he was using the prestige and authority of his office for personal gain, violating Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
2. Yes, because the Court found that the Commission’s finding of deliberate falsification of tax returns was correct.
3. Yes, because Judge Steinberg’s conduct demonstrated a complete insensitivity to the ethical obligations of judges, rendering him unfit for judicial service.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that judges must avoid personal business practices that create an appearance of impropriety and undermine the integrity of the judicial office. It cited Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which prohibits judges from using their office to promote private business ventures or engaging in business relations that conflict with their official duties. The court found that Steinberg’s conduct created the appearance that he was using his position to influence lenders and borrowers. The court noted, “Wherever he travels, a Judge carries the mantle of his esteemed office with him, and, consequently, he must always be sensitive to the fact that members of the public, including some of his friends, will regard his words and actions with heightened deference simply because he is a Judge.” The Court found that Steinberg’s use of his chambers and a judicial employee to conduct loan business aggravated the situation. Furthermore, the court upheld the commission’s finding that Steinberg intentionally misrepresented his income and deductions on his tax returns. The Court rejected Steinberg’s argument that off-bench conduct could only lead to removal if it involved overt illegality or extreme moral turpitude, stating, “Any conduct, on or off the Bench, inconsistent with proper judicial demeanor subjects the judiciary as a whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the individual Judge to carry out his or her constitutionally mandated function”. The court concluded that Steinberg’s actions demonstrated a complete insensitivity to the ethical obligations of judges, warranting his removal from office.