50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980)
The term “voluntarily” in New York Penal Law § 215.57, regarding bail jumping, preserves a grace period, limiting the scope of the non-intent crime and defining when the crime is committed rather than leaving it to the event of arrest.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period found in predecessor statutes. This limits the scope of bail jumping as a non-intent crime. The majority reasoned that the term prevents determining the commission of the crime based merely on the fortuitous event of arrest. The dissent argued that appearing due to arrest is not voluntary and thus does not satisfy the statute’s requirement. The court favored a construction that provides certainty about when the crime is committed.
Facts
The facts of the case are not explicitly detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum. However, the core issue revolves around a defendant who failed to appear as required and was subsequently arrested. The question was whether his appearance after arrest, but within 30 days, constituted a voluntary appearance under Penal Law § 215.57, thus precluding a charge of bail jumping.
Procedural History
The case originated in a lower court. The Appellate Division issued an order, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The specific details of the lower court’s ruling are not included in the Court of Appeals’ memorandum, but the central point of contention was the interpretation of the word “voluntarily” in the context of the bail jumping statute.
Issue(s)
Whether the inclusion of the word “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 eliminates the grace period present in predecessor statutes, thereby making an appearance within 30 days of a failure to appear, even if prompted by arrest, a bar to prosecution for bail jumping?
Holding
No, because the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period that existed in prior statutes, thereby limiting the scope of the non-intent crime of bail jumping to instances where a defendant fails to voluntarily appear within the specified timeframe and before arrest.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the inclusion of “voluntarily” was intended to maintain the grace period established in previous iterations of the bail jumping statute. By construing “voluntarily” in this manner, the court ensures that the determination of when the crime is committed is not dependent on the arbitrary timing of an arrest. The court highlighted the need for certainty in determining the commission of the crime. The majority implicitly adopted the reasoning of the Appellate Division, which likely emphasized a more lenient interpretation benefiting the defendant in cases of ambiguity. The dissenting opinion, referencing the dissent at the Appellate Division, argued that an appearance prompted by arrest cannot be considered voluntary. The dissent suggested that the purpose of including “voluntarily” was to provide an opportunity for defendants who fail to appear to rectify their mistake by appearing on their own within 30 days, thus escaping additional punishment. If the appearance is a direct consequence of being arrested, the dissent argued, the requirement of voluntariness is not met, and prosecution under § 215.57 is permissible. The majority’s approach effectively favors leniency and certainty, preventing the possibility of penalizing individuals who eventually appear within a reasonable time, even if prompted by law enforcement action. The practical effect is that prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant’s appearance was not voluntary in the sense that it was prompted by arrest or other compulsory measures to secure a conviction for bail jumping under this statute.