Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507 (1980)

A landowner has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable criminal acts by third parties when the landowner knows or has reason to know of prior criminal activity on the premises.

Summary

William Nallan was shot in the lobby of an office building owned by Helmsley-Spear. Nallan sued, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate security given the history of crime in the building. The jury initially found the owner negligent but also found Nallan contributorily negligent, leading to a judgment for the owner. The Appellate Division reversed on the contributory negligence issue but affirmed the judgment for the owner, finding a failure of proof on foreseeability and proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence of prior crimes was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence, requiring a new trial.

Facts

William Nallan, a union officer investigating corruption, was shot in the back while signing a guest register in the lobby of the Fisk Building, owned and managed by Helmsley-Spear, Inc. The shooting occurred after business hours when the regular lobby attendant was away from his post performing janitorial duties. Nallan had previously received threats related to his union activities, which he reported to the police.

Procedural History

Nallan sued Helmsley-Spear, alleging negligence. The trial court submitted the case to the jury with interrogatories, including a question on Nallan’s contributory negligence. The jury found the owner negligent but also found Nallan contributorily negligent, resulting in judgment for the owner. The Appellate Division reversed the finding of contributory negligence but affirmed the judgment for the owner, holding that Nallan failed to prove foreseeability and proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the history of criminal activities in the Fisk Building gave rise to a duty on the part of the building owner and manager to take reasonable steps to minimize the foreseeable danger to those entering the premises.

2. Whether the absence of a lobby attendant was the proximate cause of Nallan’s injuries.

Holding

1. Yes, because a landowner has a duty to maintain safe conditions in the common areas of their building and to take reasonable steps to prevent or minimize the risk of harm from foreseeable criminal activities.

2. Yes, because expert testimony suggested that the presence of an attendant would have deterred the assailant, making the absence of an attendant a substantial causative factor in Nallan’s injury.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in holding that Nallan failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, which states that a landowner open to the public is subject to liability for harm caused by the intentional acts of third persons if the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to discover such acts are likely to be done or fails to provide a warning. The court noted the plaintiffs presented evidence of 107 reported crimes in the building in the 21 months preceding the shooting, including 10 crimes against persons. "[A] rational jury could have found from the history of criminal activity in the other parts of the building that a criminal incident in the lobby was a significant, foreseeable possibility."

The court also addressed the issue of proximate cause, stating, "[I]t was plaintiffs’ burden to show that defendants’ conduct was a substantial causative factor in the sequence of events that led to Nallan’s injury." Expert testimony indicated that the presence of an attendant would have deterred criminal activity. The court found that "the jury in this case might well have inferred from the available evidence that the absence of an attendant in the lobby at the moment plaintiff Nallan arrived was a ‘proximate’ cause of Nallan’s injury."

Regarding the “assumed duty” theory, the court stated that for Helmsley-Spear to be liable for negligently performing an assumed obligation to provide a lobby attendant, it would have to be shown that its conduct in undertaking the service placed Nallan in a more vulnerable position than he would have been in had Helmsley-Spear never taken any action. "[D]efendant Helmsley-Spear could be held liable under an ‘assumed duty’ theory only if it was reasonably foreseeable that members of the public, such as Nallan, would rely upon the continued presence of a building attendant in the lobby of the Fisk Building and would tailor their own conduct accordingly." The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.