People v. Smith, 51 N.Y.2d 376 (1980)
In cases of attempted burglary or larceny, intent to commit a crime inside a premises can be inferred from the circumstances of the entry, the condition of the premises, and the defendant’s conduct within the premises, especially during widespread looting.
Summary
During the New York City blackout of 1977, police officers found Smith inside a vandalized appliance store. The store’s security gate was torn off, and the front window was shattered. Smith was found crouched behind a table in the disarrayed store. He was convicted of attempted burglary and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Smith’s intent to commit a crime could be inferred from the circumstances: the store’s condition, the ongoing looting, and Smith’s presence inside the store in a crouched position. This case clarifies how intent can be proven circumstantially in burglary cases.
Facts
On July 13, 1977, a city-wide blackout occurred in New York City. On July 14, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m., police officers responded to a report of a break-in at the Friendly Frost Appliance Store. The officers found the metal security gate torn from the storefront and the front plate glass window shattered. Inside, the store was in disarray, with televisions and other appliances overturned. Officer Meyer found Smith crouched behind a table in the store’s office. Smith was arrested. No witness saw Smith in possession of any merchandise.
Procedural History
Smith was convicted in the Supreme Court of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution had not proven Smith’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts.
Issue(s)
Whether the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith acted with the requisite intent to commit the crimes of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny, based on circumstantial evidence.
Holding
Yes, because Smith’s intent to commit larceny within the store can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances: the condition of the store (vandalized, looted), the time of night (during a blackout), Smith’s unauthorized presence inside the store, and his crouching position inside the store’s office.
Court’s Reasoning
The court stated that the “moral certainty” standard applies only when a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Here, there was direct evidence (the officers’ testimony) placing Smith in the store during widespread looting. Therefore, the traditional “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies. The court emphasized that intent is rarely proven directly; it is usually inferred from the circumstances. The court stated, “in deciding whether the People met their burden, we are required to say whether, considering the facts proved and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn therefrom, [the fact finder] could conclude that there was no reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crimes charged.” The court found that the fact finder could reasonably infer that Smith entered the store with the intent to commit larceny, given the condition of the store, the blackout, and Smith’s position inside the store. The court noted, “Here, defendant was discovered crouched behind a table or desk in the middle of the night in a store which obviously was the target of widespread looting. The security gate was torn from the front of the establishment, and the windows were smashed leaving pieces of shattered glass about the entry to the premises.” The court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order because intent could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances. Competing inferences, if reasonable, are within the domain of the fact-finders and are not to be disturbed by the Court.