People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980)

For speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, and delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions are generally excluded from the time the prosecution has to be ready for trial.

Summary

James Lomax was arrested and indicted for robbery. After the initial indictment was dismissed, a new indictment was filed. Lomax moved to dismiss the second indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the criminal action commenced with the first accusatory instrument. Although more than six months had passed, Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient because they did not adequately detail excludable periods resulting from his own pretrial motions, thus failing to demonstrate a clear entitlement to dismissal.

Facts

James Lomax was arrested on March 23, 1977, and charged with robbery. He was arraigned and subsequently indicted on March 28, 1977. The initial indictment was dismissed on June 14, 1977, following a defense motion. The District Attorney was granted leave to resubmit, and a new indictment was issued on June 23, 1977, encompassing the same charges. Lomax was re-arraigned. Lomax filed a second motion, including a request to inspect the grand jury minutes. A hearing was held in September 1977, but the decision denying the request was not announced until November 2, 1977. Lomax appeared for trial on December 8, 1977, but the trial was adjourned for three weeks to accommodate the District Attorney.

Procedural History

The trial court denied Lomax’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial without an evidentiary hearing. The trial ended in a mistrial. Lomax then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Lomax appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the denial of his speedy trial motion was improper.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the statutory speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 commences with the filing of the initial accusatory instrument or a subsequent indictment for the same charges?
2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Lomax’s speedy trial motion without a hearing, given his allegations of delay?

Holding

1. Yes, because under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, regardless of subsequent indictments for the same charges.
2. No, because Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient to establish a clear entitlement to dismissal under CPL 30.30, as they failed to adequately account for excludable periods attributable to his own pretrial motions.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences when the first accusatory instrument is filed. The court emphasized that “[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court, and, if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed”. Therefore, the speedy trial clock started on March 24, 1977, with the filing of the original felony complaint. However, the court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes certain periods of delay, specifically those resulting from pretrial motions made by the defendant. The Court stated, “[U]nder the clear language of CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]), such periods would generally be excluded from the total time within which the People are required by statute to become ready to proceed to trial.” Lomax’s motion papers acknowledged delays due to his motions but failed to provide specific dates, preventing the trial court from calculating the excludable time. The court reasoned that because Lomax had demonstrated some delay was excusable, he had the burden of showing that the remaining “unexcused” delay exceeded the statutory limit. Because Lomax’s papers were deficient, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the motion summarily under CPL 210.45(5). The court also rejected Lomax’s general speedy trial claim, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was not excessive, especially considering the seriousness of the charges and the delays caused by Lomax’s motions. The court balanced the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), and found no violation.