People v. Graham, 49 A.D.2d 654 (1975)

Evidence seized during a warrantless search is admissible if a motion to suppress based on the warrantless search is made during trial, when the defendant had prior knowledge of the search through pre-trial discovery.

Summary

Graham was convicted, and appealed, arguing that a piece of bloodstained glass seized from his station wagon was improperly admitted as evidence because it was obtained during an illegal search. The initial motion to suppress was based on the claim that the seizure was pursuant to an invalid warrant. However, the seizure occurred before the warrant was executed. A later motion to suppress based on the warrantless search was denied as untimely. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant was aware of the warrantless search prior to trial due to the affidavit of the police officer attached to the initial motion, and thus, the mid-trial motion was untimely.

Facts

Police seized a piece of bloodstained glass from Graham’s station wagon. This seizure occurred approximately six hours before a search warrant was executed. Prior to trial, Graham filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the seizure was based on an invalid search warrant. Attached to the motion was a police officer’s affidavit detailing the earlier search where the glass was found. During the trial, Graham made a second motion to suppress, this time arguing that the initial warrantless search was illegal.

Procedural History

The trial court denied both the pre-trial motion to suppress (based on the warrant) and the mid-trial motion to suppress (based on the warrantless search). Graham was convicted. He appealed the denial of his motions to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the pre-trial motion to suppress evidence when the motion was predicated on the theory that the seizure was made pursuant to an invalid search warrant, but the seizure occurred prior to the execution of the warrant.

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the mid-trial motion to suppress evidence based on the asserted illegality of a prior warrantless search when the defendant was aware of the search prior to trial.

Holding

1. No, because the seizure occurred before the execution of the challenged warrant and was not related to or dependent on it.

2. No, because the defendant was aware of the warrantless search before trial and failed to make a timely motion to suppress based on that ground.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the initial motion to suppress was properly denied because it was based on the invalidity of a search warrant, when the seizure of the glass occurred before the warrant was executed. The Court further reasoned that the mid-trial motion to suppress the evidence based on the warrantless search was untimely. The court noted that the police officer’s affidavit, which was attached to the initial motion, revealed that the broken glass was found during the earlier warrantless search. Therefore, the defendant was aware of the warrantless search prior to trial. By failing to raise the issue of the warrantless search in a timely manner, the defendant waived the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence on that ground. The court explicitly stated that the defendant “could not claim ‘previous unawareness’ of the facts to justify granting the deferred midtrial motion.” This highlights the importance of raising suppression arguments promptly upon learning the relevant facts.