Beame v. Council of City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 690 (1977)
Publicly approved provisions of law, such as city charters, should be interpreted using traditional standards of statutory construction rather than attempting to discern the intent of the “intelligent, careful voter.”
Summary
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Mayor of New York City could vote on budget modifications before the Board of Estimate. The plaintiffs argued that the City Charter prevented the Mayor from voting on any matter related to the budget. The defendant, the Mayor, argued that the restriction only applied to the original budget approval, not to subsequent modifications. The Court of Appeals held that the Mayor was not restricted from voting on budget modifications, and abandoned the standard of interpreting publicly approved laws by seeking the intent of the “intelligent, careful voter,” in favor of traditional statutory construction.
Facts
The president of the New York City Council and the borough presidents, all members of the Board of Estimate, sued the Mayor of New York City, who was also a member of the Board. The dispute centered on whether the Mayor could vote on budget modifications proposed by the Mayor himself. The plaintiffs argued that the City Charter prohibited the Mayor from participating in any Board of Estimate vote on the budget. The Mayor conceded he couldn’t vote on the original budget, but argued that this restriction didn’t extend to modifications under section 124(b) of the charter.
Procedural History
The Special Term ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the Mayor could not vote on budget modifications. The court reasoned that an “intelligent, careful voter” would believe the Charter excluded the Mayor from any Board of Estimate vote on the budget. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Mayor, holding the voting restriction applied only to initial budget approval. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but on different reasoning.
Issue(s)
Whether the Mayor of New York City is permitted to vote as a member of the Board of Estimate on budget modifications made pursuant to section 124(b) of the New York City Charter, given the restrictions on mayoral voting power in section 120(d) of the charter.
Holding
No, because the restriction on the Mayor’s voting power in section 120(d) of the City Charter applies only to the approval of the original budget, and the specific incorporation of section 120 in only some modification provisions of section 124 implies that it does not apply to modifications under section 124(b).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals abandoned the “intelligent, careful voter” standard for interpreting publicly approved laws, calling it an “empty legal fiction.” The court reasoned that so few voters actually review and digest the complex materials related to charter amendments that the standard is unrealistic. Instead, the court adopted traditional standards of statutory construction. Applying these standards, the court held that the City Charter should be read as a whole, considering each word to arrive at its meaning. The court determined that section 120(d)’s restriction on the Mayor’s voting power applied only to the approval of the original budget. The court found that to extend the restriction to subsequent budget modifications under section 124(b) would render the specific incorporation of section 120 in a few of the modification provisions in section 124 meaningless. The court applied the principle that “an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” Therefore, the Mayor’s power to vote on budget modifications is limited only in the instances specified in section 124(f). The court effectively applied the statutory interpretation canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.