People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)
Once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, they may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney, and any subsequent uncounseled waiver of constitutional rights will not be deemed voluntary.
Summary
Frederick Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. A key piece of evidence was a statement he gave to police after invoking his right to counsel. Cunningham initially agreed to speak with police but then requested an attorney. Later, he initiated contact with the police and, after speaking with his wife, waived his rights and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent waiver made outside the presence of an attorney is invalid. The court reasoned that this rule protects the individual’s right against self-incrimination and ensures a knowing and voluntary waiver.
Facts
Frederick Cunningham was arrested at his home at 7:00 p.m. on March 7, 1975, and taken to police headquarters. He was given Miranda warnings and initially agreed to speak with the police, but did not provide any incriminating information. Around 10:30 p.m., after being formally arrested and re-Mirandized, Cunningham stated he would not sign a waiver and wanted to consult an attorney. The police ceased questioning and booked him. At 1:30 a.m., Cunningham called the police to his cell stating he wished to make a statement. He was given Miranda warnings again, but again declined to sign a waiver, reiterating his desire for counsel. As police were returning him to his cell, he saw his wife, conferred with her, and then stated he would speak without an attorney. He then signed a waiver and made incriminating statements.
Procedural History
Cunningham moved to suppress the statement, arguing it was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement voluntary. Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether a suspect in custody, who has invoked the right to counsel, may validly waive that right and make admissible statements to police in the absence of an attorney.
Holding
No, because once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, any subsequent uncounseled waiver of their constitutional rights is not deemed voluntary under New York State’s constitutional and statutory guarantees.
Court’s Reasoning
The court emphasized New York State’s strong protection of the right to counsel, holding that it includes the right to advice of counsel before deciding to waive the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to an attorney. The court distinguished between situations where formal adversary proceedings have commenced (e.g., indictment, arraignment) and where a suspect has retained counsel. The court extended its existing protections, stating that even if a suspect has not yet secured an attorney but requests one, they are “expressing] his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice.” The court explicitly rejected the idea that the right to counsel should depend on whether a defendant had a prior relationship with an attorney. To hold otherwise would disadvantage those who are not affluent or have not previously required legal assistance. Therefore, once the right to counsel is invoked, all guarantees implicit in that right come into play, and a subsequent waiver outside the presence of counsel is invalid. The court stated: “[W]e reaffirm our position that the right to counsel in this State includes the right of an accused to have the advice of counsel before making the decision to waive either his privilege against self incrimination or his right to the assistance of an attorney, so that once a defendant in custody invokes his right to counsel, all of the guarantees implicit in that right are brought into play, and a subsequent waiver of rights outside the presence of counsel cannot be given legal effect.”