People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d 83 (1979)

To secure a conviction for burglary, the prosecution need not establish the particular crime the intruder intended to commit at the time of unlawful entry; a general intent to commit *a* crime is sufficient.

Summary

The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars requesting the prosecution to specify the crime he intended to commit when entering the complainant’s dwelling. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecution need not prove a specific intended crime for a burglary conviction; a general intent to commit any crime within the premises is sufficient. The court reasoned that requiring proof of a specific intent would lead to unnecessary and impractical hairsplitting.

Facts

The complainant was awakened in her bedroom at 1:30 a.m. by a man she claimed was a stranger and unauthorized to be in her house. After the man left, she found a window open. Items with the defendant’s name on them were found near the house. A storm window screen had been removed from a window facing a poorly lit alleyway, concealed by shrubbery. When apprehended nearby, the defendant gave conflicting statements about living at the house. The complainant’s sister, a former resident, testified that the complainant and defendant had never been in each other’s presence despite the defendant being at the house on prior occasions.

Procedural History

The defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree and burglary in the second degree. He moved to dismiss the indictment, requested a bill of particulars to specify the intended crime for the burglary charge, and sought to preclude the People from using his prior convictions for impeachment purposes (Sandoval motion). The trial court denied the request for a bill of particulars, as well as the Sandoval motion. The defendant renewed the Sandoval motion multiple times during the trial, but the Trial Judge denied all three applications, holding that it could not overrule the pre-trial Judge’s coordinate jurisdiction.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the denial of the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars, which sought specification of the crime he intended to commit inside the complainant’s premises, was an abuse of discretion.
2. Whether the Sandoval rulings by both the pretrial Judge and the Trial Judge improperly denied defendant the possibility of testifying in his own behalf.

Holding

1. No, because to secure a burglary conviction, the State need not establish the particular crime the intruder intended to commit, and requiring such specificity would lead to impractical hairsplitting.
2. No, because the exclusion of prior convictions is largely a matter of discretion for the trial courts, and neither the pretrial Judge’s nor the Trial Judge’s rulings constituted a clear abuse of that discretion.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Penal Law only requires a knowing entry with the intent to commit *a* crime, not a specified crime. It emphasized the pragmatic nature of the rule, stating that intent is subjective and must be established by conduct and circumstances. Requiring the State to prove intent to commit a particular crime would make burglary trials overly technical. The Court noted that the Legislature could have specified a