Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198 (1980)

For a physical injury to meet the threshold of ‘substantial pain’ necessary to support an assault charge under New York Penal Law, the pain must be more than petty slaps and must reach an objective level that is more than the subjective feeling of the complainant.

Summary

This case concerns the definition of “substantial pain” within the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving an assault charge. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the evidence presented—testimony that the complainant was hit in the face, cried, felt bumps, and had red marks—was sufficient to establish “substantial pain” beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the evidence was insufficient because it amounted to no more than evidence of petty slaps, which is not enough to demonstrate “substantial pain” as intended by the statute.

Facts

The respondent, Philip A., was accused of hitting the complainant twice in the face. As a result, the complainant cried, reported feeling like bumps were forming (although none did), and exhibited red marks on his face. The Family Court Judge concluded that the complainant experienced substantial pain based on his own feelings at the time of the incident.

Procedural History

The Family Court found that the respondent committed acts constituting an assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the pain experienced by the complainant constituted “substantial pain” within the meaning of subdivision 9 of section 10.00 of the Penal Law, sufficient to sustain an assault charge.

Holding

No, because the evidence presented was consistent with “petty slaps” and did not establish “substantial pain” beyond a reasonable doubt as contemplated by the statute.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that while pain is subjective, the Legislature’s inclusion of “substantial” indicated an intention to avoid a purely subjective standard. The court noted the Revisors’ notes explicitly stated that “petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives” are not within the definition of physical injury requiring substantial pain. The court referenced People v. McDowell, noting that an incidental reference to a blackened eye without elaboration on its appearance, seriousness, or pain was insufficient to establish substantial pain. Here, the court found that the complainant’s experience of being hit, feeling pain (undefined in degree), crying, and having red marks, was consistent with minor physical contact and thus insufficient to prove “substantial pain.” The court reasoned that while the trier of fact could consider the subjective reaction of the alleged victim, there remained an objective threshold implied in the Revisors’ notes. The Court stated: “Here we have nothing more than evidence that complainant was hit, that it caused him pain, the degree of which was not spelled out, caused him to cry and caused a red mark. All of that is consistent with ‘petty slaps’ and, therefore, was insufficient to establish ‘substantial pain’ beyond a reasonable doubt.”