People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 54 (1979)
Under New York law, a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy is not, by itself, sufficient to establish liability for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator; the prosecution must prove accessorial conduct beyond mere membership in the conspiracy.
Summary
McGee was convicted of conspiracy and bribery based on the actions of his co-conspirators. The New York Court of Appeals held that while McGee could be convicted of conspiracy based on the overt acts of his co-conspirators, he could not be convicted of bribery unless the prosecution proved he aided, solicited, or otherwise participated in the bribery itself. The court explicitly rejected the federal rule established in Pinkerton v. United States, which allows for conviction of a substantive offense based solely on participation in a conspiracy. The court reasoned that New York law requires a showing of accessorial conduct for liability in substantive offenses.
Facts
Rochester police officers Luciano and D’Aprile investigated gambling activities. They met with Quamina and Waters, who offered bribes for police protection of their gambling operations and pressure on competitors. Later, Quamina brought McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver into the scheme. Edwards, acting as a spokesman, proposed an arrangement where the officers would receive a percentage of receipts from assigned numbers writers in exchange for protection. McGee attended a meeting where these arrangements were discussed and indicated his agreement with Edwards’ goals. Edwards made payments to the officers. McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver were subsequently charged with conspiracy and bribery.
Procedural History
McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver were convicted in a joint jury trial of conspiracy and multiple counts of bribery. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. McGee appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he could be found guilty of bribery based solely on his status as a conspirator.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant can be convicted of a substantive offense (bribery) solely based on their participation in a conspiracy to commit that offense, without evidence of accessorial conduct.
Holding
No, because under New York law, liability for a substantive offense cannot be independently predicated upon the defendant’s mere participation in an underlying conspiracy; accessorial conduct beyond mere membership in the conspiracy must be proven.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that New York Penal Law § 20.00 defines the conduct that renders a person criminally responsible for the acts of another, and it conspicuously omits any reference to one who merely conspires to commit an offense. The court stated, “Conduct that will support a conviction for conspiracy will not perforce give rise to accessorial liability.” The court distinguished between the crime of conspiracy, which is based on an agreement, and the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy. While the overt act of one conspirator can be attributed to others to establish the conspiracy, the court held that it is “repugnant to our system of jurisprudence” to impose punishment for substantive offenses in which the defendant did not participate. The court explicitly rejected the federal rule established in Pinkerton v. United States, stating, “Accessorial conduct may not be equated with mere membership in a conspiracy and the State may not rely solely on the latter to prove guilt of the substantive offense.” The court noted that earlier New York cases stating “[e]ach conspirator is liable * * * for the acts of every associate done in the effort to carry the conspiracy into effect” required the defendant to have actively participated to a degree sufficient to impose accessorial liability. Because there was no evidence of McGee’s complicity in the bribery counts, his conviction on those counts was reversed and the indictment dismissed as to those counts.