Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 (1979)
An exculpatory agreement, intended to release a party from liability for their own negligence, must clearly and unequivocally express such intent to be enforceable; ambiguous or broad language will be strictly construed against the drafter.
Summary
Bruce Gross signed a “Responsibility Release” before enrolling in William Sweet’s parachute jumping school. After being injured during his first jump, Gross sued Sweet for negligence, breach of warranty, and gross negligence, alleging inadequate training and unsafe equipment. Sweet argued the release barred the suit. The court held the release unenforceable because it did not explicitly release Sweet from liability for his own negligence. The agreement’s ambiguous language failed to clearly convey that Gross was waiving claims arising from Sweet’s potential carelessness.
Facts
Bruce Gross enrolled in Stormville Parachute Center Training School, owned and operated by William Sweet. As a condition of enrollment, Gross paid a fee and signed a “Responsibility Release.” He received an introductory lesson, including instruction and jumps from a low table. Gross was then taken for a practice jump from 2,800 feet, during which he sustained serious injuries upon landing.
Procedural History
Gross sued Sweet for negligence, breach of warranty, and gross negligence. Sweet pleaded the release as an affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment. Gross cross-moved to strike the defense. Special Term granted Sweet’s motion and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint and granting Gross’s motion. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order based on a certified question.
Issue(s)
Whether the exculpatory agreement signed by the plaintiff barred his suit for personal injuries allegedly incurred as a result of the defendant’s negligence.
Holding
Yes, the Appellate Division’s order was correct as a matter of law because the release did not clearly and unequivocally express an intent to exempt the defendant from liability for his own negligence.
Court’s Reasoning
The court emphasized that the law disfavors contracts that exculpate a party from their own negligence, requiring such agreements to be closely scrutinized. While such agreements are not per se invalid, they are subject to a stringent standard of clarity. The court noted, “the fairest course is to provide explicitly that claims based on negligence are included.” The court found the release in this case lacked the requisite clarity, stating that it did not “express any intention to exempt the defendant from liability for injury or property damages which may result from his failure to use due care either in his training methods or in his furnishing safe equipment.” The court distinguished the case from indemnity agreements between sophisticated business entities. Instead, the court applied the general rule requiring unequivocal terms. The court reasoned that the defendant “seems to have preferred the use of opaque terminology rather than suffer the possibility of lower enrollment,” but emphasized that such exculpatory clauses require clear and unequivocal language. The court cited previous cases, like Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, where similar language was deemed insufficient to bar claims based on negligence. The court quoted Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., stating the intention to waive negligence liability must be expressed clearly and in “unequivocal terms.”